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VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE SHERMAN
ACT: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF AN
ECONOMIC MISCONCEPTION
ROBERT Boxt
STHOUGH THE LAW OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION' has been developing
,yunder the Sherman Act for better than forty years, opinions as to
what that law is, and what it has been, are still confused. In
part, this confusion reflects the state of the law; in part, it springs from a
misreading of the cases. This paper represents an attempt to reorder this
area of the antitrust law; it is an attempt to discern a consistent doctrine
concerning vertical integration running through the cases, and to evaluate
the worth of that doctrine in terms of the purposes of the Sherman Act.
The current predominant view of the case law appears to be that prior to
1940 vertical integration had not been attacked as such, and that the
Sherman Act does not, and did not, condemn such integration except
when it is used to extend monopoly from one level of production to an-
other.2 This paper reaches completely contrary conclusions. First, the
recent attacks upon vertical integration are not something new in the law.
Rather they are merely a spectacular bringing to fruition of a way of
thinking, an attitude, that goes back to the earliest cases. Second, the
Sherman Act, "new" or "old," has not condemned vertical integration
only where there was monopoly at one level of operation (horizontal
monopoly). Where the courts have thought abusive practices traceable to
t Research Associate, Antitrust Project, University of Chicago Law School.
1 Vertical integration exists when a firm "transmits from one of its departments to another
a good or service which could, without major adaptation, be sold in the market." Adelman,
Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27 (1949).
2 Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 Col. L. Rev. 921, 923 (1949), states that it was not until
recent times that vertical integration was attacked as such. Similarly, Vertical Forestalling
under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 583, 584 (1952), states: "Prior to 1940 verti-
cal integration had been condemned under the Sherman Act only where found to be an inte-
gral part of horizontal monopoly or where used as a means of extending horizontal control to
new levels." Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 63 Yale L. J. 293, 341 (1954), states: "The 'new' Sherman Act, like the 'old,' condemns
vertical integration only when it represents a device for extending monopoly power from one
stratum to another." These views run counter to some of the decided cases, which will be dis-
cussed later, and also seem to overlook the possibility that the early cases may have developed
the rudiments of a law about vertical integration as such-which is all we have even yet-
despite the fact that such integration was usually presented to the courts simultaneously with
questions of horizontal control.
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vertical integration they have condemned the integration on that ground
alone. They have also dissolved such integration when they inferred an
intent to abuse the power they believed such integration created.
Much of the misunderstanding of the law in this area arises from an
incorrect interpretation of a number of cases as vertical integration prece-
dent, and from a tendency to discount several cases that are valid prece-
dent. For purposes of exposition, therefore, the relevant cases, as well as
those often mistakenly believed relevant, have been arranged into four
major groups. In the first group are five early decisions which constitute the
only vertical integration precedent of general applicability prior to 1946.
These are the first American Tobacco case,3 the Corn Products case,4 the
two Reading opinions,5 and the Lehigh Valley decision. Far from approv-
ing of vertical integration, these cases disclose disapproval and distrust.
Each contains, implicitly at least, a number of basic economic assump-
tions; and these cases, with the economics they embody, constitute the
precursors of modem vertical integration decisions.
The second major group is composed of cases whose erroneous classifica-
tion as vertical integration precedent has contributed in large measure to
a misconception of the law of the subject. Two subgroups are contained
within this second major group. The cases of the first subgroup are those
whose facts, in the main, fail to reveal vertical integration: the Winslow
case7 Eastman Kodak,8 and the Pullman decision.9 (A minor element of
verticality places Eastman Kodak in the next subgroup as well.) The
second subgroup comprises those cases in which vertical integration,
though present in some degree, is not attacked or discussed in those terms.
Eastman Kodak, Union Carbide," and International Harvester" belong
here.
The third major group includes all of those cases that express approval
3 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700 (S.D. N.Y., 1908), rev'd 221 U.S.
106 (1911), 191 Fed. 371 (S.D. N.Y., 1911).
4 United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D. N.Y., 1916).
5 United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912); United States v. Reading Co., 253
U.S. 26 (1920).
6 United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
7United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
8 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W.D. N.Y., 1915), 230 Fed. 522
(W.D. N.Y., 1916), appeal dismissed 255 U.S. 578 (1921).
9 United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa., 1943).
10 Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 15 F. 2d 678 (C.A. 4th, 1926).
"United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 Fed. 987 (D. Minn., 1914), appeal
dismissed 248 U.S. 587 (1918); 10 F. 2d 827 (D. Minn., 1926), aff'd 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
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of vertical integration: United States Steel,2 Standard Oil (1931 merger), 8
Republic Steel,14 and the Alcoa remand. 5 It is the thesis here that these
cases constitute a separate category within the class of vertical integration
precedent. In each case vertical integration seemed to the court a natural
and even necessary form of organization because it was the prevailing
pattern of the industry involved. But this fact alone would not have
sufficed to invoke judicial approval had it not been for the general absence
of abusive practices connected with vertical integration. Therefore, while
they concern vertical integration, these cases are limited as precedent to
those instances where such integration is the pattern of the industry, and
where the power thought to be created by the integration does not seem
to have been abused.
The cases of the fourth, and last, major group are the modern decisions
disapproving in some measure of vertical integration: A & P,16 Yellow
Cab I," Paramount,8 Columbia Steel, 9 Yellow Cab l ,2 and the Paramount
remand. 21 These cases are commonly supposed to have signalled a new
trend in vertical integration law. Yet analysis makes it apparent that they
are consistent with the five early decisions of the first group, adding, for
the most part, only greater explicitness to the ideas expressed in the
latter. Clearly, then, the law of vertical integration has not done an about-
face since 1940; it has consistently condemned such integration wherever
connected with abuses or intent to monopolize. Although the position
was subsequently abandoned, the Supreme Court at one time even seemed
to consider vertical acquisitions illegal per se.
Perhaps a major reason for the confusion in the law (as distinguished
from opinions about the law) is the inappropriateness of the concept of
vertical integration both for the purposes of the Sherman Act and as an
12 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 Fed. 55 (D. N.J., 1915), aff'd 251 U.S.
417 (1920).
13 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 47 F. 2d 288 (E.D. Mo., 1931).
1 United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio, 1935).
15 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y., 1950).
16 United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E. D.
II., 1946), aff'd 173 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
1United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
18 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
19 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
20 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
21 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. N.Y., 1949).
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analytical tool. This paper therefore concludes with a brief economic
analysis of the concept itself, and a suggestion as to its proper future em-
ployment in Sherman Act cases.
I
Early Vertical Integration Cases
The early Sherman Act cases on vertical integration are important to-
day primarily because the economic conceptions they embedded in the
law still persist, shaping and directing the latest decisions. Generally, the
early cases betray a belief that vertical integration makes possible, or
even probable, a variety of predatory economic practices. The courts
believed further that vertical integration creates power which, acting
through these abuses, enables a firm to monopolize one or more levels of
production. Consequently, the illegality of vertical integration was not de-
pendent upon the presence of horizontal monopoly (which might or might
not have been obtained through the misuse of such integration), but was
dependent upon the presence of predatory abuses. The following examina-
tion of the five early Sherman Act opinions reveals the nature of the
abuses to which vertical integration was thought to lend itself, and makes
it clear that most of the current judicial notions in this area, which are
often thought of as recent innovations, actually have their origin in the
very first cases on the subject. Although some of the judicial economic
theories are conmiented upon in passing, the main purpose of this section
is to trace the development of the law; most of the economic criticism has,
therefore, been reserved for the paper's second section.
The old American Tobacco case was the first Sherman Act decision deal-
ing with the problem of vertical integration.2 2 Although the case presents
no direct holding on the subject, two legal rules seem implicit in the vari-
ous opinions and decrees. First, vertical integration becomes illegal when
it is employed to extend illegal horizontal monopoly to new stages of
production. Second, such integration is illegal, even absent unlawful
monopoly, where the power it confers is, or seems likely to be, used in
pursuit of a monopoly position. Neither the district court nor the Su-
2 Vertical disintegration was effected in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911), but apparently not consciously. The Supreme Court held that the combina-
tion, "in and of itself, is not only a continued attempt to monopolize, but also a monopoliza-
tion. .. ." Ibid., at 77. The combination was loose, being accomplished merely by having
Standard of New Jersey hold the stock of the other companies. The Court chose the easiest
form of dissolution which was to require Standard of New Jersey to turn the stock it held over
to the shareholders of the subsidiary companies. This returned the industry to its position
before the utilization of the trust device. Thus the vertical dissolution effectuated appears to
have been an unplanned by-product of the decree. See Hale, op. cit. supra note 2, at 924.
[Vol. 22
19541 VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT 161
preme Court made explicit its economic analysis. But it must be assumed,
since they acted on the above rules, that they entertained the economic
theories which necessarily underlie them. The first rule requires as under-
pinning the assumptions that vertical integration provides a means of
extending monopoly power, and that such an extension is undesirable. The
second rule assumes that, apart from monopoly, vertical integration cre-
ates market power, and that such power can be employed to monopolize.
Passing the question of the validity of these assumptions for the time
being, it is important to note their entrance into the Sherman Act through
the American Tobacco case.
Two instances of vertical integration in the case were American's
ownership of suppliers of tinfoil and of licorice paste. Each did a major
portion of the business in its line, the licorice firm supplying 95 per cent
of the market for paste. American had also integrated forward into the
retail level through control of the United Cigar Stores Co. which did only
an insignificant fraction of the retail business.
The lower American Tobacco court 3 said little about vertical integra-
tion; it was concerned primarily with horizontal control achieved through
combination as a restraint of trade . 4 So viewing the case, it dismissed the
bill as against United Cigar Stores.2 In connection with this dismissal,
however, the court did suggest a test for determining intent to monopolize
other than percentage of the market controlled: "It cannot be assumed
that a company which sells the products of all alike intends to secure a
monopoly for one. 28 The implication was that vertical integration could
be used, although it had not been here, to secure a monopoly at one
level by the force of leverage from another. According to this view, there-
fore, vertical integration would be an earmark of greater power than the
percentage of horizontal control alone might indicate. And, presumably,
a retailer's practice of dealing exclusively in the products of its manu-
facturing parent might be evidence of an intent to monopolize the manu-
facturing level.
The decree2 7 ordered both the licorice and foil companies, which were
combinations of the principal firms in their fields, dissolved into their
original constituents. Furthermore, the new licorice and foil companies
were cut off from the new tobacco manufacturing companies. The lan-
guage of the Supreme Court, as well as that of the lower court upon re-
mand, indicates that this vertical disintegration was not unintended.
23 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700 (S.D. N.Y., 1908).
214 Ibid., at 701-2. 25 Ibid., at 709. 2 Ibid.
2 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 1024 (S.D. N.Y., 1908).
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Of the foil company the Supreme Court said only that its production
was more than half that of the industry, and that tinfoil was essential for
packaging tobacco products. 8 The opinion's discussion of the licorice firm
was, however, more revealing, for the Court observed that the company
had obtained a virtual monopoly through the acquisition of competitors,
and that no one unable to obtain licorice paste could compete in the manu-
facture of plug tobacco.29 The suggestion was that the ownership of the
licorice monopoly was, or could have been, a tool for monopolizing the
next level. And the opinion later listed as a factor indicating a wrongful
purpose and-an illegal combination "the gradual absorption of control
over all the elements essential to the successful manufacture of tobacco
products, and [the] placing [of] such control in the hands of seemingly
independent corporations serving as perpetual barriers to the entry of
others into the tobacco trade." 3 The Court then went on "without stop-
ping to amplify the reasons which lead us to that conclusion" to hold that
lower court had erred in dismissing the bill as to United Cigar Stores.31
United had not attempted to monopolize the retail tobacco business, nor
had it in any way aided the growth of monopoly on the manufacturing
level. The treatment accorded United Cigar Stores, therefore, seems to
denote suspicion of vertical integration even where it had been used
neither to extend monopoly to a new level nor to maintain it at the old.
Perhaps the Supreme Court thought that vertical integration produced
the power to monopolize, that such power had been used in the case of
the licorice and foil companies, and, therefore, that defendants ought not
to be permitted to retain any similar integration.
Upon remand the decree again provided not only for the horizontal dis-
solution of the licorice and foil companies, but also for their separation
from the new tobacco manufacturing firms.32 "The evil of controlling the
production of elements essential to tobacco manufacture must be met by
requiring the tobacco manufacturing corporations to be disconnected from
the production of such elements." 33 This statement arose from a belief
that control at one level could be employed to gain control or prevent
entry at another. Presumably the percentage of control at each level
would be lawful after the decree. Yet one of the new tobacco companies,
28 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 168-69 (1911).
29 Ibid., at 170-71.
30 Ibid., at 183. 31 Ibid., at 185.
"United States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371, 418-20 (S.D. N.Y., 1911).
"Ibid., at 388.
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which was to have 33 per cent of plug production,34 was not *to be al-
lowed to control one of the new licorice firms with just about the same
share of paste production.n Since each firm's share of its market was legal,
but they were not to be permitted to join, the court must have been
troubled about the power created by vertical integration regardless of
horizontal monopoly.
The reasons for the lower court's divestiture of United Cigar Stores 6
are not entirely dear. One judge thought corporate stockholding an evil.3
Another thought the Suprenie Court had reversed the dismissal of the bill
as to United only because American's ownership of two-thirds of United's
stock brought the latter into the general combination. But inasmuch as
the lower court did not ban all corporate stockholding, and since United
had not been shown to have aided the growth of monopoly, the divesti-
ture of United might be said to show a suspicion of corporate stockhold-
ing where it accomplishes vertical integration.
The law or, perhaps more accurately, the judicial attitude toward verti-
cal integration was thus ill-defined. Such integration was clearly bad when
monopoly at one level could be used to gain or bolster monopoly at an-
other. But there are at least strong indications in the American Tobacco
case that vertical integration might be bad even where it was not so used.
Such integration might be a sign of power, and if some vertical integration
had been used as a means of monopolizing, then perhaps both it and other
vertical integration would be destroyed. -
Although the Corn Products Refining Co. case dealt primarily with issues
of horizontal monopoly, judge Learned Hand's discussion of the vertical
aspects of the case contains, in rudimentary form perhaps, ideas about re-
coupment and price "squeezes" which today play a large part in vertical
integration law. Corn Product's monopoly position in glucose and starch
markets was constantly eroded by entry into those fields. In 1907 a con-
sumer of glucose, the National Candy Co., began its manufacture and
sale. In an unsuccessful attempt to force National Candy to limit its out-
put, Corn Products entered the field of candy-making with one factory, and
sold at or near cost. Later Corn Products bought three more candy
" Ibid., at 411.
36 Ibid., at 419. T Ibid., at 422.
37 Ibid., at 388. Although it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court's opinion required
divestiture of the retail stores, the lower court obviously interpreted the Supreme Court as
saying that corporate stockholding was some sort of abuse. Probably the abhorrence of the
holding company device in the Standard Oil case and in Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), contributed to that impression.
38 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371, 383 (S.D. N.Y., 1911).
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factories to wage war on candy manufacturers who refused to stop buying
their glucose from National Candy.
Corn Products also sought control over syrup made from glucose by
keeping equal, or nearly so, the prices at which they sold glucose and
mixed syrup. By driving independent syrup mixers out of business in
this manner, Corn Products acquired well over half, perhaps about 71 per
cent, of the syrup business.3 9
Another of Corn Product's monopolizing tactics was the price war. In
discussing the predatory low-price campaign in glucose, Judge Hand said,
"[t]hey never meant to keep prices so low, and could not have endured, if
they had done so, except by making up through excessive prices on
specialties.1 40 Judge Hand was here using a recoupment theory. The state-
ment appears to mean that prices were raised on end products in order to
recoup losses from low glucose prices. Of course, such price-raising could
occur only where there was monopoly power in the markets for end
products; and, if there was such power, Corn Products would already
have raised prices there. 41 But the fallacy of the recoupment notion is not
pertinent here; it is pertinent that the notion has colored much judicial
thought about all forms of integration, and that it appeared in the Corn
Products case. 42
The price "squeeze" which was intended to drive the syrup mixers out
of business is another example of the sort of abuse to which vertical
integration is supposed to lend itself. Although it is difficult to understand
why Corn Products would attempt to monopolize the syrup market,43
39 234 Fed. 964, 1007, 1008 (S.D. N.Y., 1916).
40 Ibid., at 1014.
41Adelman, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46.
42 Actually Judge Hand's argument does not require the theory of recoupment: it is enough
that the predator possess profit-making units not engaged in the price-cutting campaign. Any
integration outside the market in which price-cutting occurs is helpful in financing predation.
The problem is not peculiar to vertical integration.
4 3 Entry into the mixing trade would seem to be much easier than that into glucose manu-
facture-which appears to have been easy enough-so that Corn Products could not have
hoped to obtain a stronger monopoly position in the mixing field than the one they already
occupied. Second, Corn Products could not have expected to attain by "squeeze" tactics a
larger proportion of the mixing business than they already had in the glucose market. And,
third, the two monopolies, were they attained, would be vertically related and hence only one
monopoly profit could be extracted. One possible reason for Corn Products to monopolize both
the glucose and syrup markets would be as a defense against entry by increasing the capital re-
quirements for entrance. This possibility is not convincing, for Corn Products would have had
to control substantially the entire production of glucose in order to force entrants in the syrup
field to be fully integrated, and Corn Products did not have such control. Furthermore, the no-
tion that the imposition of larger capital requirements would impede entry rests on the assump-
tion that there were serious imperfections in the capital market. There is no reason to believe
that such was the case.
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it is clear that they did attempt it, and that the price "squeeze" was the
tactic employed. But the concept of vertical integration is not helpful in
understanding the so-called "squeeze" as a predatory device for driving
competitors out of a market. 44 Should a nonintegrated mixer decide to
monopolize the trade he could sell syrup at the glucose price just as well
as a vertically integrated firm could. The fact that such a tactic is called
a "squeeze" when employed by a vertically integrated firm serves, il-
logically, to make the practice seem even more oppressive. Properly,
"squeezes" should be regarded merely as price-cutting campaigns in the
market affected. Otherwise the abuse becomes associated with the con-
cept of vertical integration, although it does not spring from that form of
organization at all.
The provisions of the decree which followed the Corn Products decision
are not very instructive as to the law of that time. In 1919 a consent decree
was entered into which did little to the vertical integration of the defend-
ant except to require divestiture of the candy factories. 45 The failure to ob-
tain divestiture of the business in end products, particularly syrup, indi-
cates nothing as to the then current beliefs concerning vertical integration,
since, as one observer put it: "This agreement, like several others entered
into by the Attorney General during or shortly after the war, seems to
have been dictated less by a desire to insure a strict observance of the
Sherman Law than by a panicky fear of the consequences to general busi-
ness from any disturbance in the affairs of large-scale combinations. '46
The developing law of vertical integration became more explicit in
the three Anthracite Cases. The first of this trio, the 1912 Reading decision,
although a cartel case, contained plain implications for the law of vertical
integration. Defendants, a group of railroads and their subsidiary coal-
mining companies, were found to be in combination to control the mining
and transportation of anthracite. The six defendant carriers not only
dominated the transportation of coal to tidewater, but, through their con-
trolled mining companies, produced and sold about 75 per cent of the
annual supply of anthracite. The Supreme Court immediately singled out
defendants' vertical integration as a significant factor because it tended
both to increase the temptation to act in concert, and to facilitate such
action when undertaken. 47
For an example of a "squeeze" designed to make a market more competitive rather than
less, see note 133 infra.
45 N.Y. Times, p. 15, col. 2 (April 1, 1919).
46 Watkins, Industrial Combinations and Public Policy 218 (1927).
47 "The chief significance of the fact that the six carrier defendants control substantially the
only means for the transportation of coal from the mines to distributing points at tide-water is
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It was common in the anthracite industry for independent producers
to sell to the railroad defendants at 65 per cent of tidewater prices rather
than ship and sell themselves. The Court believed that the railroads'
ownership of coal mines enabled them to force this alternative upon the
independents.
If the rate of freight to tide-water was onerous and was imposed upon the coal pro-
duced by the defendants and their allied coal producers without discrimination against
the coal of the independent shipper, it would nevertheless bear upon the latter oppres-
sively, since the rate paid would find its way into the pocket of the defendants. There-
fore, it was that the higher the freight rate, the greater the inducement to sell to the
carrier companies.4 s
This statement apparently means that defendants' vertical integra-
tion made possible a coercive price discrimination. The argument is that
any rate the independents paid for transportation was a real cost to them,
whereas the amount of the rate was a matter of indifference to the railroad-
owned coal companies, because, in effect, they paid the rate to them-
selves. The Supreme Court thought that the railroads could, therefore,
coerce the independent coal companies by raising the shipping rate until
the independents were forced to sell their coal to the railroads. Actually,
the railroad cartel had a certain amount of monopoly power, and no more.
Whether this power was exerted in the roundabout manner supposed by
the Supreme Court, or in collecting monopoly return through high
shipping rates, makes no difference. The presence of vertical integration,
therefore, did not affect competition in coal mining. According to the
Court's theory a price discrimination results every time a vertically inte-
grated firm has a monopoly at one level, for independents at the next level
would pay the monopoly price while the monopoly's affiliate at that level
would be paying the price to itself. This reasoning is meaningless,4" but it
served to supply the Court with a theory of a mechanism whereby vertical
integration with a monopoly at one level could hamper competition at
another.
The second Reading case, decided in 1920, brought vertical inte-
gration directly in question, and represented a culmination of the
kind of reasoning about vertical integration that had characterized earlier
in the fact that they, collectively, also control nearly three-fourths of the annual supply of
anthracite which there finds a market. The situation is therefore one which invites concerted
action and makes exceedingly easy the accomplishment of any purpose to dominate the supply
and control the prices at seaboard." 226 U.S. 324, 340-41 (1912).
48Ibid., at 359.
49 See pp. 195-97 and relevant notes supra.
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judicial comments. No cartel was involved in Reading II. The suit asked
the dissolution of the intercorporate relations between the defendants on
the theory that they constituted a combination in restraint of trade in
anthracite, and an attempted and actual monopolization of that trade.
The 1896 reorganization of the old Reading Co. had left the properties
and functions of the old company unchanged, but it set up the Holding
Company, which owned the cars, engines, equipment, etc., and the Read-
ing Railway Company, which owned the track; all of the latter's stocks
and bonds were owned by the Holding Company. The Holding Com-
pany also held all of the stock of the Reading Coal Company. Issues of
horizontal integration were present in the case, but the vertical integration
was dealt with separately. The Court thought that in the partial subsi-
dization of the Coal Company by the Holding Company it had discovered
the mechanism by which vertical integration hurt nonintegrated com-
petitors." The Coal Company was said to gain thereby an unlawful com-
petitive advantage over other coal producers. The fact that this mecha-
nism made no economic sense5' did not prevent it from becoming part of
the law.
Much the same situation was present in United States v. Lehigh Valley
Railroad Co. Again the language of vertical integration led to meaningless
analysis. Lehigh was said to have purchased coal lands along its lines to
prevent competition in the carrying of coal over its lines.5 2 In describing
one purchase of coal lands the Court said: "This purchase was con-
60 The Court said that the records of the case and a 1915 I.C.C. investigation showed that
"the Reading Coal Company had never paid any dividends on its stock, and that, while the
books of the Holding Company showed the Coal Company to have been indebted to it in a
sum exceeding $68,000,000 for advances of capital made by the Reading Railroad Company
before the reorganization in 1896, it has paid interest thereon only occasionally and in such
small amounts that up to 1913 it fell short by more than $30,000,000 of equaling 4% per annum
on the indebtedness. In the meantime advances of large sums had been made by the Holding
Company to the Coal Company and unusual credits had been allowed the latter in the pay-
ment of its freight bills. This dealing of the Holding Company with the Reading Coal Com-
pany, and similar dealing of the Central Company with the Wilkes-Barre Coal Company and
the Navigation Company [all dominated by the Holding Co.] are denounced by the Commis-
sion as unlawful discrimination against other shippers of coal over the rails of these two com-
panies, and, obviously, such favoritism tends to discourage competition and to unduly restrain
interstate commerce." 253 U.S. 26, 53-54 (1920).
5' The Court's reasoning assumes that the Coal Company got money and services free.
This is, of course, not true, since the capital and services represented a cost to another part of
the same organization, the Holding Company. The failure of one part of a firm to pay divi-
dends, interest, and freight to another part of the same firm is of bookkeeping significance
only. If we assume that the Coal Company was being subsidized to operate at a loss in order to
monopolize, the case is no different. The whole firm is then losing money in order to monopo-
lize. Any firm, integrated or not, may do that; vertical integration does not provide a peculiar
mechanism whereby such monopolizing becomes possible.
52 254 U.S. 255, 259 (1920).
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fessedly made to prevent the diversion of traffic to other lines. ,,13 The
Court seemed to be condemning the acquisition of suppliers, whether or
not they occupied monopoly positions.
Lehigh's Coal Company had been created in 1875, and in 1912 a Sales
Company was split off to buy and resell all the coal mined or purchased
by the Coal Company. Stock in the Sales Company was issued to the
stockholders of the Railroad Company. The contract between the Coal
Company and the Sales Company set the price of coal at 65 per cent of the
tidewater price; the Sales Company was to buy and sell no other coal.
The Court said this last was "a provision which excludes the Sales Com-
pany, potentially a strong competitor, from the market. '5 4 The contract
was held "so calculated to restrain interstate trade as to be obnoxious to
the Anti-Trust Act of Congress. . . ."5 This reasoning is particularly
interesting since the Coal Company had formerly performed the func-
tions delegated to the Sales Company, and there was no suggestion that it
had been illegal for the Coal Company both to mine and market its own
coal. The formation of the Sales Company restricted no competition that
had existed; it left things as they had been. It is difficult to understand
how the change in form constituted a violation of the Sherman Act, what-
ever the situation may have been as to other law. Here, as in Reading II,
the Court ordered dissolution of the relations between the Railroad Com-
pany and the Coal Company, and also cut adrift the Sales Company.
No valid explanation for the last two Anthracite Cases can ignore the
predominant part played by judicial hostility to vertical integration where
the issue was presented in that form. Reading I went on the cartel point
but contained strong implications for vertical integration. Reading II
dealt in part with horizontal integration, but the language of the case,
as well as the vertical disintegration effected, make it clear that vertical
integration was a main factor in the decision. That is even more true of
the Lehigh case where horizontal integration was not a factor. The per-
centages of horizontal control in Reading II and in Lehigh did not ap-
proach those held legal in United States Steel and in International Harvester.
Attempts have been made to restrict these cases to their particular facts
on the ground that the Supreme Court emphasized defendants' histories
of illegal practices and evasions of the law. 6 However, the illegal practices
violative of the Sherman Act had been enjoined in Reading I, and, sup-
posedly, abandoned thereafter. The Supreme Court's recollection of these
6 Ibid., at 261.
5 bid., at 266. 55 Ibid., at 267.
"6 See Vertical Forestalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 583, 586 (1952).
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long-past abuses in Reading II and Lehigh can hardly have been a basis
for vertical disintegration. At least, the contemporaneous United States
Steel opinion seemed to say that abandoned bad practices were to be for-
given. The evasions of the law were not evasions of the Sherman Act but
of Pennsylvania law and of the "Commodities Clause" of the Interstate
Commerce Act.5 7 It cannot be supposed that evasions of those laws con-
stitute a violation of the Sherman Act.
It has been further argued that because the Anthracite Cases involved
railroads they fall within a special category."8 The suggestion that the
courts watch railroads more closely than other enterprises is not without
force.59 The basis of a separate category for railroads lies, however, in the
notion that railroads partake of the nature of natural monopolies and
therefore must be kept from combining to make the monopoly more com-
plete. 0 This reasoning hhs no application to a case, despite a suggested
analogy of the patent tie-in decisions, 61 where a railroad acquires or com-
bines with a company not engaged in furnishing transportation.
Thus the special grounds proposed for restricting the Anthracite Cases
to their facts are seen not to suffice. Nor can the cases be explained on the
more general theory that vertical integration is condemned when it is
used by a monopoly at one level to extend its control to another, for, as
has been pointed out, at neither level were the percentages large enough
57 34 Stat. 585 (1906), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(8) (1929). This clause prohibits the transportation
by railroads of articles in which they have an interest.
58 Univ. Chi. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 56, at 586 n. 24 (1952), citing Levi, The Antitrust
Laws and Monopoly, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1947).
519 See the concurring opinion of Justice Brewer in Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 363 (1904); United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 226 U.S. 61, 83 (1912).
There is an implication that railroad cases are different in United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531 (1948). Reading II is cited there, but it is cited together with three rail-
road merger cases so that the implication as to the separateness of the railroad cases, if it
exists, would seem to apply to the merger of competing railroads in Reading II rather than to
the vertical integration in the case. This would explain the fact that the Lehigh case was not
cited there.
60 "It must also be remembered that under present conditions a single railroad is, if not a
legal, largely a practical, monopoly, and the arrangement by which the control of these two
competing roads was merged in a single corporation broadens and extends such monopoly."
Justice Brewer in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 363 (1904).
61 Consult Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1947).
The analogy between railroads and patents seems invalid. Granting, arguendo, that each has
monopoly characteristics, it does not follow that a railroad's acquisition of a coal mine ought
to be treated like the tying of an unpatented product to a patented one. The conventional
analysis of the tie-in situation is that the patentee has extended his monopoly beyond the
limits of his grant. In the railroad case, however, the purchase of the coal mine does not extend
the natural-monopoly characteristics of the railroad to the coal extraction industry. If the
railroad is the only shipper from a coal field, it will be able to exert monopoly power against the
collieries. But the railroad could do that whether it owned a coal mine or not.
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to be illegal. The Anthracite Caqses cannot be explained satisfactorily ex-
cept on the theory that vertical integration was illegal where it was used
to hamper competition at one of the levels upon which the integrated
firm operated. Under this theory of the cases horizontal monopoly need
not be shown at any level. There is also an implication that the acquisi-
tion of a supplier is illegal, even though the supplier is not in a monopoly
position, when that acquisition is accomplished with the intention of pre-
venting competitors from dealing with the supplier. By inference, the
same rule would apply to the acquisition of a customer. Such a rule would,
of course, amount to a per se doctrine. It was to reappear in the first
Yellow Cab case. Lehigh and Reading II seem analytically consistent, then,
with the preceding cases; the only difference is that in the former the
government for the first time attacked vertical integration directly, pre-
senting a theory of the way in which vertical integration operated to sup-
press competition.
The foregoing examination of the early cases discloses a number of
judicial ideas about vertical integration. Among these were: (1) Vertical
integration makes possible the use of one horizontal monopoly to gain
another at a different stage of production; (2) such integration can be
used to gain a monopoly at one level even though no other horizontal
monopoly is already held; (3) it makes possible predatory "squeezes" for
the purpose of monopolizing; (4) it makes possible recoupment and hence
aids monopolizing by price wars; (5) it makes possible, or even probable,
price discrimination by a monopoly level as between an affiliate and its
competitors at the next level; and (6) one level can subsidize another and
thus give the second an unfair competitive advantage. Four legal rules
grew out of these economic theories. First, vertical integration is illegal
when it is used by a monopolist at one level to gain a monopoly at another.
Second, even where there is no horizontal monopoly, vertical integration
is illegal when the power it confers is abused in an attempt to monopolize
horizontally. Third, a particular vertical integration may be illegal even
though not misused in any way if other vertical integration has been mis-
used. And, fourth, there was a strong suggestion that the vertical acquisi-
tion of a supplier or customer is illegal where the acquisition is accom-
plished with an intent to prevent competitors from dealing with the
acquired firm. Since there was no requirement that the acquired firm
occupy a dominant position in its field, the fourth rule approaches a per se
doctrine. Perhaps this rule should be read as requiring specific intent, but
as applied in the Lehigh case the rule seemed satisfied with very little
intent beyond that which normally motivates any acquisition.
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Cases Sometimes Improperly Classified as Vertical Integration Precedent
It may be objected that the foregoing analysis of the law is incorrect,
or at least seriously incomplete, since it ignores a number of cases that
approved of vertical integration. It seems well, therefore, before going on,
to meet this objection by examining these cases. The view taken here is
that the decisions in this group do not constitute vertical integration
precedent, and that the mistaken citation of them as such is responsible
for much misunderstanding of the law. The cases within this group fall
into two subgroups: (1) Cases whose facts reveal not vertical, but com-
plementary, integration (these cases will fit into the next subgroup as
well); and (2) cases in which vertical integration was either not attacked
or not dicussed.
United States v. Winslow, the earliest of the first subgroup's three cases,
has frequently been said to exemplify early judicial approval of vertical
integration. But Winslow does not involve vertical integration. Prior to
1899 the defendants had been organized in three groups, making sepa-
rately, under patents, several different kinds of shoe machinery, which
were employed at successive stages of the shoe-manufacturing process.
The practice of the industry was to lease rather than sell the machines to
shoe manufacturers. In 1899 the defendants merged to form the United
Shoe Machinery Company. The new firm's leases now tied the machines to-
gether, so that in many instances the shoe manufacturer must take all or
none. The indictment was interpreted, however, as attacking only the
combination and not the leases. The Supreme Court's decision that the
combination did not constitute a Sherman Act offense has been inter-
preted as an endorsement of vertical integration, at least when no unlaw-
ful horizontal monopoly is involved.
The difficulty with using Winslow as a vertical integration precedent is
that the facts do not disclose any such integration. "A firm is called
vertically integrated when it transmits from one of its departments to an-
other a good or service which could, without major adaptation, be sold in
the market."8 2 Obviously, the merger of 1899 did not create that kind of
integration in United Shoe. Yet the merger did not create merely a diversi-
fied or multiproduct firm. The machines sold by the new firm were com-
plementary products,63 and it was because of this that it had been especial-
12 Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, op. cit. supra note 1.
63 A complementary relationship between products exists "when a rise in the consumption
or purchases of one causes a rise in the demand for the other... ." Boulding, Economic Anal-
ysis 246 (1948).
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ly worth while to effect the merger. 4 The integration of complementary
monopolies leads to far different results than the integration of vertical
monopolies,65 and it is, therefore, important that the cases not be con-
fused.
The Winslow case might nevertheless rank as a vertical integration
precedent if the Supreme Court had thought of it that way. There is no
indication that the Court did. To be sure, Justice Holmes said: "The dis-
integration aimed at by the statute does not extend to reducing all manu-
facture to isolated units of the lowest degree. It is as lawful for one cor-
poration to make every part of a steam engine and to put the machine to-
gether as it would be for one to make the boilers and another to make the
wheels."66 The steam engine example may be said to contain an element
of verticality. But if that situation is analyzed as vertical integration, then
nearly all manufacture must be similarly regarded, and the concept loses
its meaning. justice Holmes was merely saying that the Sherman Act
does not require the separation of every manufacturing function that can
be separated. Neither the language nor the facts of the Winslow case,
therefore, tell us anything concerning vertical integration.
A second case often erroneously cited as vertical integration precedent
is United States v. Eastman Kodak Co. The integration usually thought of
as vertical there-the manufacture by one firm of cameras, films, papers,
and plates-is not vertical, but complementary. This phase of the East-
man Kodak case, the major phase, is subject to the same analysis as the
Winslow case, and, like the latter, has no proper place among vertical
integration precedents. Eastman Kodak did present a minor degree of
64 The shoe manufacturers could use the machines which made up their production lines in
varying relationships and proportions. Where separate monopolists control the production of
complementary products (whether used in fixed or variable proportions) it is impossible to say
what price each will get for its product. In fact, where the products are used in variable pro-
portions, it may be that the total return to the monopolies in separate hands will not be as
large as the return to the same monopolies held by one firm. That is, where complementary
products may be used in variable proportions, the monopolist controlling all of such products
may be able to maximize his profit by charging different amounts for the various products than
would likely be charged by single monopolists who sold one such product each. Separate
monopolists would, of course, have no interest in maximizing the total profit from the com-
plementary products, for one would not reduce its profit in order to increase that of the other.
Consult Bowman and McGee, Product Complementarity and the Law of Tie-In Sales (un-
published paper).
65 The joining of monopolies of complementary products used in variable proportions may
permit the maximization of total monopoly profit. But the joining of two monopolies vertically
related in the preparation of a product for market adds nothing to total monopoly profit. In
the latter case, a single monopoly would set its price so that the price to the ultimate con-
sumer would be at the point returning the greatest profit. The ownership of an additional
monopoly vertically related to the first would afford no way of extracting additional return.
11 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1913).
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vertical integration in the defendant's acquisition of 12 per cent of the
nation's stockhouses.67 But the court seemed to view this acquisition pri-
marily as an attempt at the horizontal monopolization of the wholesale
trade, evidenced by the taking of restrictive covenants from the officers of
the acquired concerns, and the dismantling of the facilities obtained. 8 The
court's emphasis upon these abuses as showing an intent to gain a horizon-
tal monopoly prevented this part of the case from becoming vertical
integration precedent.69
The last of the three cases whose facts are improperly viewed in terms
of vertical integration is United States v. Pullman Co. The Pullman
decision is more meaningfully analyzed, both legally and economically, in
other terms. Pullman was the sole manufacturer and owner of railroad
sleeping cars, and the sole furnisher of sleeping-car service. There were
thus three monopolies in the case, of which the ownership monopoly was
perhaps the most important legally. Pullman had tied these monopolies
together by various devices, among which were contract provisions to the
effect that Pullman would furnish all of the sleeping cars used by the
various railroads, and that Pullman would service only cars it owned. The
manufacture of sleeping cars and the servicing of those cars, when carried
out by the same company, is, in a sense, vertical integration. But that tells
us nothing significant, for vertically integrated monopolies return no more
monopoly profit than would either of the monopolies separately.70 The
furnishing of the cars and the furnishing of car service, however, do stand
in a relation of complementarity to each other, so that Pullman did derive
more monopoly profit than would a monopolist of either car-furnishing or
car-servicing alone. This is one reason the case is not meaningfully analyzed
in terms of vertical integration.
The crux of the Pullman opinion, however, lies in its discussion of the
feasibility of the alternatives open to the railroads. The court's conclusion
was that, for the railroads to buy and own their own sleeping cars, an
enormous capital outlay would be required, which, for the smaller roads
at least, would be financially impracticable. The feasibility of such an
alternative was further reduced, according to the court, by the fact that
67 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62, 75-76 (W.D. N.Y., 1915).
6s Ibid.
61 Nor may Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 614 (1927), be re-
lied upon to show approval of vertical integration. That case held only that the FTC had no
power under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to order Eastman Kodak to di-
vest itself of property acquired prior to any action by the FTC.
70 See note 65 supra.
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modem railroad travel requires through service, and by the fact that the
alternation of peak and non-peak seasons for the various roads requires
that greatly varying numbers of cars be available. These requirements
mean that, practically, a pool of sleeping cars is necessary. Legally and eco-
nomically, the need for the pool is the crux of the case. Legally, it meant
that iPullman's ownership monopoly was a "bottleneck" monopoly. It
would not have been impossible for each road to purchase enough cars to
take care of peak and non-peak seasons. Nor would it have been abso-
lutely impossible to require passengers to change cars as they traveled
over different roads. But such courses were so difficult as to be impracti-
cable. The case is, therefore, in regard to the need for a pool, quite like
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis71 and Associ-
ated Press v. United States,72 the two best-known "bottleneck" monopoly
cases. In economic terms, the other Pullman monopolies owed their con-
tinuance to Pullman's ownership of the practically indispensable pool, for
none could manufacture if Pullman would not buy, and none could service
if Pullman insisted upon servicing its own cars.
The decree therefore required a separation of the business of owning
cars and furnishing services from that of manufacturing cars.7 3 The court
believed that the need for a pool would keep the business of ownership a
monopoly and, therefore, regulated the manner in which the monopoly
could be used. Regulation, rather than dissolution, is a distinguishing
characteristic of "bottleneck" monopoly cases.74
A second opinion75 dealing with Pullman's sale of its car-owning and
- 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
-'326 U.S. 1 (1945).
73 The decree required: (1) The separation of the business of owning and servicing cars from
the business of manufacturing them; (2) the establishment of the right of any railroad to pur-
chase used sleeping cars from the Pullman Co.; (3) that Pullman operate and service sleeping
cars designed and built by any manufacturer and tendered to it for operation and service; (4)
the establishment of the right of any railroad wishing to operate all or a portion of its own
sleeping-car business to do so, regardless of existing contracts with Pullman; (5) the establish-
ment of the obligation of Pullman Co. to furnish through-line sleeping-car service to any rail-
road or group of railroads; and (6) the elimination of exclusive-dealing contracts between Pull-
man and the railroads. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 137 (E.D. Pa., 1943).
74 The decree in the St. Louis Terminal case, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), required that the terminal
facilities be made available to all roads on the same terms offered to association members, and
that membership in the association be open to all roads on the same terms as those enjoyed by
present members. The decree in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), went
only to the elimination of the effects of discrimination between competitive and noncompeti-
tive applicants for membership. The further question of whether AP could freeze its member-
ship after eliminating the effects of discrimination was not answered. The reasoning of the ma-
jority, however, indicates that AP might well be required to admit all applicants.
75 United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa., 1945-46).
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servicing businesses to a group of railroads shed further light on the
"bottleneck" monopoly aspects of the case. The court approved the sale,
but decided that the provisions of the judgment entered against Pullman
would continue to apply to the business under railroad ownership, and
under the ownership of anybody who might purchase the business from
the railroads. 76 This provision reflected a clear recognition of the mo-
nopoly's "bottleneck" character.
Although the railroad purchasers did 95 per cent of the passenger-
carrying business of the nation, the court thought their joining together
to own the sleeping-car business did not substitute a new monopoly for
the old. The terms of the decree were said to prevent such a result as to the
businesses of manufacturing and furnishing sleeping-car service by open-
ing entry into those fields.77 But it was not expected that entry into the
business of owning cars would dissipate the monopoly there.
This whole problem would be a more simple one if the order could be that Pullman
go out of the sleeping car business and sell to the individual railroads at fair terms such
of its supply of sleepers as individual railroads needed. But that should not be done.
The necessity of a reserve pool of cars to meet peak loads of all and seasonable require-
ments of some of the roads was discussed in the main opinion in this case. In the
nature of things, this must be a common pool, with some sort of unified operation and
control, if it is to be effective. All the parties have recognized the necessity of maintain-
ing this pool.... The railroad plan proposes to maintain such a reserve, through a co-
operative venture in which all may join.... We also know that if any one of the
partners in the cooperative enterprise starts to play fast and loose with one of its
associates, this Court is open to a suitor who claims that our decree is not being
complied with.75
It has been argued that the railroad group became vertically inte-
grated through its acquisition of the business of car-owning and servicing,
and that the fact that the court allowed such integration demonstrates
(assuming that the railroads were not monopolistic, or at least that they
were so regulated as to be unable to exercise monopoly power) that
vertical integration is legal where horizontal monopoly power is not
present.79 Passing the troublesome question of whether vertical integra-
71 Ibid., at 110.
77 Thus, entry into manufacturing was to be opened by requiring that the company owning
the car pool purchase on the basis of competitive bidding. Ibid. The business of furnishing
sleeping-car service was to be opened to competition by allowing railroads to furnish their own
service or obtain it where they wished. Ibid., at 112. The court expected, therefore, that the
businesses of manufacturing cars and of furnishing car service would cease to be monopolies
once they were no longer tied to the monopoly inherent in the sleeping-car pool.
78 Ibid.
79 Comment, Vertical Forestalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 583,
587 (1952). This position would, of course, make it difficult to say that the Anthracite Cases
went as they did because they were railroad cases. Ibid., at 586.
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tion was in fact involved, 80 the answer to this proposition is that the
court did not think of the purchase as creating such integration. This was
clearly indicated by the court's refutation of the government's contention
that letting the railroads acquire the car-owning and servicing business
was like allowing a public utility to be run by its chief customers.8 '
Thus, not only are the facts of the Pullman case more meaningfully
analyzed in economic terms as showing complementary rather than
vertical integration, but also the case belongs legally to the "bottleneck"
monopoly, rather than vertical integration, precedents. The divestiture
had no significance as a measure of vertical dissolution: "This separation
was not an end in itself, but merely a means of policing to insure compli-
ance with the decree."'8
2
The second subgroup contains three cases whose facts present vertical
integration in some degree, but which nevertheless fail to qualify as
precedent in the field. These cases are not precedent either because
vertical integration was not attacked, or if it was, the courts nonetheless
did not view the problem in those terms. The Eastman Kodak decision falls
within this as well as within the preceding subgroup because of the court's
failure to treat Eastman's ownership of stockhouses as a vertical integra-
tion problem (the Pullman case would belong here too, if its facts were
thought to disclose vertical integration).
There are two further cases that belong to this subgroup. The first,
International Harvester, is frequently cited for the proposition that vertical
integration was not suspect until recently. The vertical aspects of the
80 To say that a railroad becomes vertically integrated when it buys the business of owning
the cars it uses means one of two things: Either (1) vertical integration is defined as taking
place whenever an intra-firm transaction replaces a market transaction, or (2) such integra-
tion arises whenever a firm performs two functions, such as owning and using, which could con-
ceivably be separate. (1) makes the presence or absence of vertical integration depend upon
historical accident. The railroads owned their own freight cars. We could not know if this con-
stituted vertical integration until we discovered whether there ever had been a time when the
railroads rented their freight cars. Clearly, this way of defining vertical integration is not very
helpful. (2) defines vertical integration so that all firms that own anything they use in per-
forming a function come within the definition. Thus the term includes almost all firms and is
so broad as to be useless. Reading the court's approval of a sale of sleeping cars to the railroads
as an approval of vertical/integration by the railroads seems no more plausible than reading
Judge Wyzanski's order that United Shoe Machinery Corp. offer shoe machines for sale as well
as for rent, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 349 (D. Mass.,
1953), as a judicial approval of vertical integration by shoe manufacturers.
81 "Sleeping car service, like dining car service, is part of the essential business of carriage
of passengers.... The carrier is obligated to furnish the service or see that it is provided. Were
it not for the historical accident of the independent development of the sleeping car company
as a concessionaire to furnish the service, one would expect to find it furnished by the railroad
itself." United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. Pa., 1945-46).
Ibid., at 110.
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Harvester combination, however, were not considered by the various
courts.8 3 The only reference to Harvester's integration into the supplier
level came in a lower-court dissent which stated that Harvester was able
to dominate the industry because of advantages such as its "ownership
and manufacture of raw material (steel)." 84 Presumably, the dissent was
not claiming that Harvester's steel mills were more efficient than those of
the rest of the steel industry, so the remark must mean that because Har-
vester owned its own mills it got steel more cheaply by saving the profit
which would otherwise go to a steel manufacturer.s That notion, like
recoupment, is a persistent one. It continues to haunt the vertical integra-
tion cases, sometimes explicitly; more often it is unstated, serving to lend
sinister coloration to the concept of vertical ownership.
The last decision in this subgroup is Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. The facts of this case reveal both complementary
and vertical integration,86 but such integration was not relevant to the
decision, for the plaintiff attacked, and the court considered, only an al-
leged division-of-markets agreement between defendants and a com-
petitor. The only mention of anything resembling vertical integration was
83 The consent decree entered into after the first lower-court opinion did provide that Har-
vester should have only one representative for the sale of its machines in any city or town.
See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 704-5 (1927). The theory was
that Harvester foreclosed retail markets to its competitors by tying up all the dealers in a town
with exclusive-dealing contracts. This argument, which was endorsed by the Supreme Court
in reviewing the consent decree, does not explain why new dealers would not enter the field to
market competitive machines, or why competitive manufacturers could not themselves estab-
lish retail outlets. The argument assumes either that dealers are a unique resource or that
capital is artificially scarce. The former assumption really concerns horizontal monopoly; the
latter assumption is contained in all theories that vertical integration impedes entry. Neither
assumption appears to have any basis in fact. Nevertheless, the courts in the Harvester case
seemed to accept the notion that a partial monopolist at the manufacturing level could buttress
or extend that monopoly by acquiring a second monopoly at the retail level.
81 United States v. International Harvester Co., 10 F. 2d 827, 829 (D. Minn., 1926).
81 For a demonstration of the fallaciousness of such reasoning see Comment, Vertical Fore-
stalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 583, 612 n. 176 (1952), and authorities
there cited.
8 The subsidiaries of defendant Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. were the Union Carbide
Co. (a manufacturer of calcium carbide, from which acetylene gas is made), Union Carbide
Sales Co. (a seller of carbide), Prest-O-Lite Co. (manufactures and compresses acetylene gas
and sells it in containers), the Linde Air Products Co. (compresses oxygen, which is used in
conjunction with acetylene gas in the cutting and welding industry, and sells the oxygen in
portable cylinders), the Oxweld Railroad Service Co. (installs oxyacetylene cutting and welding
apparatus for railroads, keeps it in repair, and furnishes supervision and instruction as to its
use). Obviously many of these companies were related in a complementary rather than a verti-
cal fashion. E.g., acetylene gas and oxygen are complementary products in their uses in cutting
and welding. Oxweld is related to the others in both a complementary and a vertical manner.
Even the selling effort provided by Union Carbide Sales Co. may be analyzed in terms of com-
plementarity. Consult 3 Hicks, Econometrica 7 (1935). Be that as it may, vertical integration
was certainly present in some of the intercorporate relations.
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plaintiff's complaint that its competitor, Davis-Bournonville Co., a manu-
facturer of oxyacetylene cutting and welding apparatus, had from time
to time received subsidies from defendant's subsidiaries, Union Carbide
Co. and Linde Air Products. This was offered as evidence of collusion to
divide markets, but the court accepted the explanation that the purpose
of the subsidies was to enable Davis-Bournonville to sell more of its
apparatus and thus widen the market for calcium carbide and compressed
oxygen. Acetylene gas is made from the former, a product of Union
Carbide. Compressed oxygen, made by Linde Air Products, is used in
conjunction with acetylene gas in cutting and welding. It had been the
policy of Carbide and Linde to subsidize other such equipment makers."7
The court did not see the problem as one of vertical integration, nor had
the plaintiff attacked it as such.
Thus none of the cases in this second major group qualify as vertical
integration precedent, either because their facts show complementary
integration, or because the courts dealt with them in other terms.
Cases Approving of Vertical Integration
Each of the four decisions in the third group is a valid precedent ap-
proving of vertical integration. But in each case it is clear that the ap-
proval of such integration rests upon two conditions: (1) A general
absence of abuses connected with vertical integration; and (2) the
prevalence of that form of organization in the industry. Because vertical
integration was the dominant pattern in the industries involved, the
courts were led to believe that it was technologically and competitively
desirable. But where integration is thought to be a means of predation, the
mere fact that such integration is common in the industry will not save
it from destruction. Reading II and Lehigh are examples of this situation.
The absence of abuses is the important factor in rendering vertical integra-
tion legal. But, in the close case, the industry pattern may tip the balance.
Vertical integration was accorded only cursory discussion in United
States Steel,88 and, insofar as it was considered, such integration was
thought to be required by the technology of steel-making. This view was
buttressed by the observation that the competitors of United States Steel
were also vertically integrated. The abusive practices in the case had been
abandoned and, in any event, were not related to the defendant's vertical
organization.
87 Such subsidies from a manufacturer of a product to the manufacturer of a second product
related to the first in a complementary fashion may often be rational behavior. The cost to the
first manufacturer may be analyzed as selling or advertising costs.
88 223 Fed. 55 (D. N.J., 1915), aff'd 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
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The second of the four cases in this group, United States v. Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey, brought vertical integration under examination in a
rather odd way. Standard of New York and the Vacuum Oil Co.-here-
after called Socony and Vacuum-proposed to merge. The government
sought an injunction against the merger as a violation of the decree
entered in the 1911 Standard Oil case. The government's attack was not
upon vertical integration, but upon the elimination of competition be-
tween Socony and Vacuum. The court's approval of the merger rested
primarily upon its finding that the competition which would be eliminated
was slight, and that the new firm would continue to be faced by strong
rivals in all of the relevant markets. Vertical integration was then
brought into the case for the first time by the court as a further justifica-
tion for the merger. The court explicitly approved such integration be-
cause it was the dominant pattern of the industry and therefore seemed
necessary to the ability to compete. 9 This reasoning was identical to that
in the United States Steel opinion.
The same logic dictated the result in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.
The government proceeded there under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
complaining of the elimination of competition between the merging firms.
The court found the competition eliminated to be slight, and endorsed the
merger as an attempt to obtain vertical integration in order to cut costs.9 0
The fact that the industry was depressed 91 made cost-cutting seem par-
ticularly desirable. Thus, consistent with earlier cases, this opinion ap-
proved vertical integration because it was the dominant pattern of the
industry, and because it seemed technologically necessary for successful
competition. As in the preceding case, there could be no abuses because
the vertical integration had not yet been accomplished.
The Alcoa remand, the fourth case in this group, did not disturb the
defendant's vertical integration for two reasons. First, it was a relief case,
and the Court of Appeals had focused attention on horizontal monopoly
as the illegality to be remedied. Second, the remand court seemed to
assume the necessity for vertical integration, perhaps because Alcoa's new
89 47 F. 2d 288, 309-10 (E.D. Mo., 1931). Significantly the court exhibited the same er-
roneous notions about vertical integration as are seen in the cases disapproving such integra-
tion. E.g., the court lists among the advantages of integration "the ability to make up tem-
porary losses in one stage of the business by profits in another." Ibid.
90 11 F. Supp. 117, 125 (N.D. Ohio, 1935).
91 Ibid., at 124.
9United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1945). Judge Learned
Hand's opinion there had contained nothing relevant to vertical integration except a discussion
of the price "squeeze" worked upon independent sheet aluminum makers. Ibid., at 436-38.
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competitors, Reynolds Metal Co. and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corp., had adopted that form of organization. 93
When the above four cases are correctly understood as decisions resting
on somewhat special grounds, it becomes apparent that some of the
strongest support has been removed for the idea that the courts once com-
pletely approved of vertical integration. And when all of the cases in the
two foregoing groups are put to one side, it is apparent that there is no
longer any support for that proposition. Of the cases examined so far, only
the first five constitute precedent as to the legality of vertical integration
where connected with abuses. Those opinions clearly expressed disap-
proval of vertical integration in such circumstances. That was the law in
the early history of the Sherman Act. The cases to be examined next make
it clear that the law has not been materially altered.
Modern Vertical Integration Decisions
After the Anthracite Cases there were no vertical integration opinions
of general applicability until 1946. 9 4 But after that date such decisions
appeared with increasing rapidity. These later cases constitute the fourth
major group to be discussed. It will be seen that most of the ideas con-
cerning vertical integration found in recent cases had already appeared
93 In evaluating the competitive situation in the aluminum industry the court assessed the
relative strengths of the three firms at each of the stages of production. Each firm had adequate
facilities except that Kaiser had small ore reserves and therefore bought 92 per cent of its
bauxite from Alcoa. Their contract specified that, so long as it met the terms of rival shippers,
Alcoa would ship at least 90 per cent of the ore sold to Kaiser. It was shown that Kaiser's raw-
material costs were well above those of Alcoa and Reynolds. One inference from this might
be that Alcoa had some degree of monopoly power in the field of bauxite supply and was
charging Kaiser the monopoly price. But the court ignored that possibility. Instead, it used a
vertical integration analysis: "Part of this difference is the profit that accrues to Alcoa on sales
to Kaiser, and on ocean transport." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp.
333, 376 (S.D. N.Y., 1950). Of course, neither the profit Alcoa made on sales to Kaiser nor on
ocean transport could in any way lower Alcoa's costs. Nor could the profit raise Kaiser's costs
unless it was a greater-than-competitive profit. But in that case, correct analysis would put the
cost of ore to the next level of Alcoa at the price charged to Kaiser, so that the raw-material
costs of the two should be equal. The only remaining problem would be Alcoa's monopoly
power in bauxite. However, the court's use of the concept of vertical integration served to
obscure the horizontal problem. The court's solution was a hope that Kaiser would go out and
develop its own ore reserves. That solution would have been the correct one if the court had
viewed vertical integration as a way of by-passing a horizontal control which the court could
not dissolve, or if the court had attributed the differential in raw-material costs to the internal
efficiencies of vertical integration.
94 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932), is not vertical integration precedent for
two reasons: (1) Justice Cardozo, speaking for a four-man majority, saw the issue as one of
diversified integration-whether the meat packers should be allowed to engage also in the dis-
tribution of groceries; (2) the opinion appears to go, at least in part, upon the fact that the
action was a petition to revise a decree voluntarily accepted. Ibid., at 119. The district judge,
however, appears to have placed weight upon vertical integration as a reason for refusing to
modify the decree to permit retailing. Levi, A Two Level Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 567, 577-78 (1952).
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or been foreshadowed in the five early cases. The modem cases, like the
early ones, assume that vertical integration may create the power to
monopolize through the use of predatory tactics. The courts continue to
believe that vertical integration may make possible such monopolizing
tactics, among others, as recoupment, the subsidization of one level by
another, price discrimination, and the extension of control from one level
to the next. The recent decisions differ from the early ones mainly in their
greater explicitness as to the evils which spring from vertical ownership.
An examination of the fourth group's cases in chronological order also
reveals the continuation and culmination of the movement toward a per
se doctrine which began with the Anthracite Cases. The cases then disclose
the law's movement away from a per se position toward the earlier rule
that vertical integration plus abuse spells illegality.
In 1946 the District Court opinion in United States v. New York Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. ran almost the full range of judicial errors in
regard to the economics of vertical integration. But, since the Court of
Appeals opinion repeats most of the District Court's reasoning, only one
part of the latter's analysis will be examined. A & P was integrated from
manufacturing and brokerage through retail operations. The court stated
that A & P's profits at nonretail levels were used to subsidize their retail
stores. This subsidization was said to enable the retail outlets to lower
their profits and sell more, which in turn increased nonretail profits be-
cause of the increased volume of business at those levels. Thus, the court
reasoned, A & P was able to undercut its competitors without sacrificing
profits.9 5 There is, of course, no such mechanism as that described by the
court; the integrated manufacturer maximizes total profits by maximiz-
ing at each level.96
The Court of Appeals' opinion97 said that A & P used "its large buying
power to coerce suppliers to sell to it at a lower price than to its competi-
tors on the threat that it would place such suppliers on its private black-
list if they did not conform, or that A & P would go into the manufactur-
ing business in competition with the recalcitrant suppliers." 98g A & P's
proposal to make its own supplies is reminiscent of Corn Products' an-
nounced intention to make candy unless the candy manufacturers took
96 67 F. Supp. 626, 641 (E. D. Ill., 1946).
9 With the proviso that the vertically integrated firm with monopolies on two levels will
allow only one level to behave as a monopoly. See p. 196 supra.
97 United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 7th,
1949).
11 Ibid., at 82.
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their supplies from Corn Products at the latter's prices. The implication
there was that Corn Products would discipline the candy-makers by
selling below a competitive price. Here there was no such implication; ap-
parently A & P was merely saying that at the prevailing prices it would
find it profitable to manufacture its own supplies. Nevertheless, the court
saw something sinister in the threat to integrate.9 In the quotation above,
the court coupled the threat not to buy with the threat to integrate and
denounced the former as a boycott."' Perhaps the court was saying that,
for a firm of A & P's size, the threat to make one's own supplies is as
illegal as a boycott.
The main object of the government's attack, however, was the Atlantic
Commission Co. (ACCO), a subsidiary of A & P set up to purchase fruits,
vegetables, and produce. ACCO acted not only as a buyer for A & P but
as a buying and selling agent for others in the trade. The court imagined
that ACCO's dual role gave A & P a great advantage:
Suppose an item was selling in the market at 100. ACCO could buy it for A & P
and have its choice of the quality at 95. The balance of the trade could buy at 100 and
pay ACCO a 5% brokerage. Thus the price to A & P was 95 and to A & P competitors
105.101
This passage is a fair example of the court's thinking about vertical
integration. It is, of course, erroneous. A & P must be said to pay a com-
petitive return to ACCO for its services, and hence the price to A & P is
100. The difference between 100 and 105 is attributable to A & P's
preferential discounts and has nothing to do with vertical integration.
Thus ACCO's dual role gave A & P no advantage. But the court went
even further astray in its review of ACCO's performance: "From this evi-
dence, we see that ACCO collected brokerage from the trade, which in-
creased the price to A & P's competitors, and the brokerage went into
A & P's coffers to increase its competitive advantage.' 0 2 Of course, the
brokerage competitors paid to ACCO did not increase the price to them,
for the brokerage had to be paid to somebody in one form or another. Nor
could A & P gain any "competitive advantage" because its subsidiary was
paid for services rendered. 0 3
9' Ibid., at 83. M Ibid., at 85.
"0'Ibid., at 87. "02Ibid.
03 The A & P decision revealed hostility to other integration perhaps not entirely vertical.
A & P defended the size of its profits on allowances received from suppliers for advertising and
for bags and labels. The court responded: "However that may be, the fact remains that A & P
was not in the label business any more than it was in the advertising business, but it managed
in both to realize a substantial difference between the cost to it and what it realized out of the
transaction from other suppliers." Ibid., at 86.
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The court also evinced hostility to vertical integration in another
connection.
... A & P owned and controlled, through the vertical integration of its system, cer-
tain corporations that were engaged in the manufacturing and processing of merchan-
dise for sale by A & P in its stores.... These companies were satellites of the A & P
system. Their products were sold only to A & P stores and were invoiced at a markup
above the cost of production. These corporations were tools in the hands of A & P,
used and useful in maintaining the two-price level to enable it to maintain its position
of dominance in the retail food business. Whatever the spread between cost to these
defendants in processing and manufacturing and what they invoiced the goods to A & P
for, was credited on the books to A & P. This, of course, was a bookkeeping transaction
between A & P and its satellites and was a paper profit which eventually went to reduce
the cost of the products to the retail stores when allocated to their credit....
No question is raised about the fairness of the method of allocation of the accumu-
lated profits and allowances. When made, they have the effect of reducing to the retail
store the cost of merchandise sold. It is the predatory method through which this ac-
cumulation of profits and allowances is obtained and not the method of allocation or
statistical handling of them that is challenged by the Government. With this large fund
accumulated at the buying and supplying level and allocated to the advantage of low
cost of merchandise to the retail or selling level, A & P's enormous power or advantage
over competitors emerges more clearly when we consider the evidence on the retail
level."'
The court went on to discuss price-cutting by A & P's retail stores. The
ability to continue price-cutting was attributed partly to the profits ob-
tained at other levels of vertical integration, and partly to profits obtained
by recoupment in other retail operations.1°5
The ability to wage price-cutting campaigns may indeed spring from
integration, horizontal or vertical. But that merely means that a firm need
not lose money overall if it derives profits from units not engaged in
price-cutting. The firm with the largest pocketbook has a good chance of
hanging on longest in a price war. Vertical integration is no different in
this respect from any other form of integration.
The A & P court thought, moreover, that vertical integration enabled
A & P to get its supplies at cost while its competitors paid the market
price. This is a recurrent fallacy. A & P had to charge itself for the
products of its manufacturing subsidiaries what those products would
104 Ibid.
105 
"When the gross profit rate is reduced in Area X, it is an almost irresistible conclusion
that A & P had the power to compensate for any possible decline in net profits by raising the
gross profit rate and retail prices in Area Y, where it was in a competitive position to do so."
Ibid., at 87. The same idea of recoupment had appeared earlier when the court referred to the
non-cost-justified discounts given A & P for its quantity purchases: "the supplier had to make
his profit out of his other customers at higher prices, which were passed on to the competition
A & P met in the retail field." Ibid., at 83.
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have brought on the market. Nor could manufacturing profits have been
used to lower the cost of merchandise to the retail stores. The real cost
remained, whatever bookkeeping stunts were performed. The court also
referred to the "predatory method" of accumulating manufacturing and
processing profits, but cited no evidence of predation in the usual sense.
Apparently the allocation of the profits of one division to another was
regarded as a predatory tactic, although the court maintained that the
method of such allocation was not questioned. In this the A & P opinion
followed the Supreme Court, which, in Reading HI, had denounced the
subsidization of one level by another as an abuse.
The A & P decision must be taken as a major victory in the attack on
vertical integration. In regard to the manufacturing subsidiaries, the court
seemed to be condemning mere bookkeeping procedures. Perhaps the
court would not have discerned evil in the integration had A & P kept its
manufacturing and processing profits in a separate pocket from its retail
profits. The court's reasoning with respect to ACCO is somewhat more
complex. Since the court thought that ACCO got goods more cheaply for
A & P by saving the latter brokerage fees, it seemed to be condemning
vertical integration itself. The decision also seemed to make it illegal for
ACCO to charge for services rendered other retailers. Whether vertical
disintegration would have been necessary to satisfy the court, or whether
bookkeeping changes designed to prevent the appearance of subsidization
of one level by another would have sufficed, cannot be known since the
case was a criminal action. Probably the case does not say that vertical
integration is illegal per se. Perhaps it is to be interpreted as stating that
vertical integration is suspect in itself, and becomes illegal when accom-
panied by abuses such as systematic price-cutting in final markets. That
is, contrary to some formulations, 10 vertical integration may not be an
abuse which spells illegality when found with some monopoly power. It
may be rather that vertical integration replaces monopoly power in the
equation and becomes illegal where connected with abuses.
The farthest advance of the assault on vertical integration came in
the first Yellow Cab decision. The complaint there alleged, in part, a
combination and conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade in the sale
of motor vehicles for use as taxicabs to the principal cab-operating com-
panies in Chicago, Pittsburgh, New York, and Minneapolis. The Checker
Cab Manufacturing Corporation (CCM) and its controlling stockholder
had gained control of operating companies, holding, respectively, 86 per
cent, 100 per cent, 15 per cent, and 58 per cent of the cab licenses in those
11 Levi, A Two Level Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 Nw. U. L. Rev. 567, 583-85 (1952).
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cities. The alleged restraint was the exclusion of competitors from the
market consisting of the acquired operating companies and the preven-
tion of purchases by those companies from other manufacturers. The
crucial passage in the opinion was:
Nor can it be doubted that combinations and conspiracies of the type alleged in this
case fall within the ban of the Sherman Act. By excluding all cab manufacturers other
than CCM from that part of the market represented by the cab operating companies
under their control, the appellees effectively limit the outlets through which cabs may
be sold in interstate commerce. Limitations of that nature have been condemned time
and again as violative of the Act. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 18-19,
and cases cited. In addition, by preventing the cab operating companies under their
control from purchasing cabs from manufacturers other than CCM, the appellees deny
those companies the opportunity to purchase cabs in a free, competitive market. The
Sherman Act has never been thought to sanction such a conspiracy to restrain the free
purchase of goods in interstate commerce. 10 7
This wording later became the basis for the government's contention
that vertical integration was illegal per se. The Supreme Court, however,
has receded from the position it apparently took here, and has refused to
construe the passage as laying down a per se rule. Nevertheless, the lan-
guage does seem to say that it is illegal without more when parties, acting
through a conspiracy, integrate vertically by acquisition, and remove the
acquired firm from the market as a consumer. Presumably, the acquisi-
tion of a supplier would have the same result. The conspirators here were
the various interrelated cab companies and CCM's principal stockholder.
The Paramount decision soon made it clear, however, that vertical in-
tegration was not in the category of per se violations, although a minority
of the Court thought it ought to be. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, said:
Exploration of these phases of the cases would not be necessary if, as the Depart-
ment of Justice argues, vertical integration of producing, distributing and exhibiting
motion pictures is illegal per se. But the majority of the Court does not take that view.
In the opinion of the majority the legality of vertical integration under the Sherman
Act turns on (1) the purpose or intent with which it was conceived, or (2) the power it
creates and the attendant purpose or intent. First, it runs afoul of the Sherman Act if it
was a calculated scheme to gain control over an appreciable segment of the market and
to restrain or suppress competition, rather than an expansion to meet legitimate busi-
ness needs. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57; United States v. Lehigh Valley
R. Co., 254 U.S. 255, 269-270. Second, a vertically integrated enterprise, like other ag-
107 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1947). In a footnote the Court
explained: "To the extent that the controlled operating companies are charged higher than the
open market prices, they are injured." This observation is meaningless since, to the same
extent, the parent is benefited, and it makes little difference at which level of operation the
profit appears on the books. Minority stockholders in the subsidiary may be injured by such a
practice, but that is not the concern of the Sherman Act.
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gregations of business units (United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d
416), will constitute monopoly which, though unexercised, violates the Sherman Act
provided a power to exclude competition is coupled with a purpose or intent to do so.
As we pointed out in United States v. Griffith, ante, p. 100, 107, n. 10, size is itself an
earmark of monopoly power. For size carries with it an opportunity of abuse. And the
fact that the power created by size was utilized in the past to crush or prevent competi-
tion is potent evidence that the requisite purpose or intent attends the presence of
monopoly power.... Likewise bearing on the question whether monopoly power is
created by vertical integration, is the nature of the market to be served (United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra, p. 430), and the leverage on the market which the
particular vertical integration creates or makes possible.10 8
The majority's tests require some explication. The first rule states that
vertical integration is illegal if it was meant "to gain control over an ap-
preciable segment of the market and to restrain or suppress competition,
rather than to serve legitimate business needs." "Appreciable" apparent-
ly means only that the segment is not so small as to be de minimis. The
competition that is meant to be restrained can scarcely be that in the
entire market invaded-that would be a monopolizing offense. The Court
was apparently referring to the competition for the business of the ac-
quired firm. Thus any vertical acquisition followed by exclusive dealing
with the acquired firm results in illegality, unless it is shown that the
acquisition was to meet "legitimate business needs." Therefore, the rule
is that vertical acquisition is illegal, except in cases where there is a
"need" of the type sanctioned by the courts. How wide the exception is
in relation to the rule remains to be seen. The citation of the Anthracite
Cases for this rule is, perhaps, indicative of the direction in which the
rule tended, or in which justice Douglas desired that it tend. The language
referred to in the Lehigh opinion, for example, was a statement in colorful
terms that the railroad bought coal lands with the intention of con-
trolling the production, transportation, and sale of the coal produced from
the land it bought, and that the railroad thus obtained a monopoly of the
transportation and sale of that coal. This language means only that the finm
was vertically integrated and that the Court could not see any compelling
reason why it ought to be.
The second majority rule is less comprehensible. It states that vertical
integration is illegal as a monopoly where the integration creates the
power to exclude competitors, and where there is an intent to do so. The
power to exclude referred to can hardly be the power to exclude com-
petitors from the market consisting of the acquired firm, for that is the
definition of vertical integration. The second rule would then constitute
108 334 U.S. 131, 173-74:(1948).
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a true per se doctrine. The power to exclude must mean the power to
achieve horizontal monopoly on either the new level or the old. We are
told that vertical integration may create "size," and "size is itself an ear-
mark of monopoly power." Monopoly power is usually defined in terms
of market percentages and difficulty of entry, but the Court may have a
different notion of the sources of monopoly power than do the econo-
mists.1°9 To be considered along with "size" is "the nature of the market
to be served," which, because of the reference to Alcoa, appears to mean
whether or not the market is so narrow that it can support but one firm.
"Leverage" is also important, but we are not told what it is. Probably it
is the ability to use control at one level to gain control at another. The
extension of monopoly from one level to another is thus but one factor to
be considered in the second rule. But, if the control at the first level is
lawful, it is difficult to understand why the same amount of control at the
second level (which is all that could be obtained in this manner) should be
unlawful, unless there is something wrong with vertical integration itself.
The second Paramount rule, then, views vertical integration as some-
times creating the power to exclude. An intent to use this power makes it
illegal. Such intent is usually inferred from the presence of abuses.
"Leverage" is only one of a number of such abuses. The second rule
states, therefore, that vertical integration which creates the power to ex-
clude is illegal, whether or not accompanied by horizontal monopoly,
where such integration is connected with predatory abuses.
Almost immediately the Court split over the application of the Para-
mount rules to a factual situation. In Columbia Steel the government
sought an injunction against the acquisition of Consolidated Steel Corp.
by Columbia Steel Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of United States Steel
Corp. U.S. Steel's president, Farless, had testified that the purpose in
buying Consolidated was to assure a market for plates and shapes made
by Columbia.' This admission would seem to satisfy the first Paramount
rule, but the government was relying instead upon Yellow Cab I as a hold-
ing that vertical acquisition was illegal per se. The reasoning of the
Court's denial of this proposition is worth quoting.
We do not construe our holding in the Yellow Cab case to make illegal the acquisition
by United States Steel of this outlet for its rolled steel without consideration of its
effect on the opportunities of other competitor producers to market their rolled steel.
In discussing the charge in the Yellow Cab case, we said that the fact that the con-
spirators were integrated did not insulate them from the act, not that corporate in-
tegration violated the act. In the complaint the government charged that the defend-
109 See the discussion at pp. 200-201 infm as to a noneconomic concept of "power."
210 334 U.S. 495, 506 (1948).
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ants had combined and conspired to effect the restraints in question with the intent
and purpose of monopolizing the cab business in certain cities, and on motion to dismiss
that allegation was accepted as true. Where a complaint charges such an unreasonable
restraint as the facts of the Yellow Cab case show, the amount of interstate trade af-
fected is immaterial in determining whether a violation of the Sherman Act has been
charged. A restraint may be unreasonable either because a restraint otherwise reason-
able is accompanied with a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint or be-
cause it falls within the class of restraints that are illegal per se .... Nothing in the
Yellow Cab case supports the theory that all exclusive dealing arrangements are illegal
per Se.
A subsidiary will in all probability deal only with its parent for goods the parent can
furnish. That fact, however, does not make the acquisition invalid. When other ele-
ments of Sherman Act violations are present, the fact of corporate relationships is ma-
terial and can be considered in the determination of whether restraint or attempt to
restrain exists.1 "
The Court, in the above passage, rather misleadingly refers to a charge
in Yellow Cab I that defendants had conspired with the intent to monopo-
lize the cab business in certain cities. Such a conspiracy was charged, but
it was not under discussion when justice Murphy wrote the language
taken by the government to be a per se condemnation of vertical integra-
tion. At that point, Justice Murphy was discussing only the fact that
other cab producers were excluded from the market provided by the ac-
quired operating companies, and that the latter were restrained from
choosing among the various manufacturers. Thus, the horizontal monopo-
lization of the cab-operating business in the four cities was not relevant
to that part of the Yellow Cab I opinion dealing with vertical integration.
Nor was it entirely correct for Justice Reed to say in Columbia Steel that
Yellow Cab's point was merely that integration was no shield for con-
spirators. Yellow Cab did say that, but the language quoted from that
case includes much more. A per se rule was laid down for the case where
a combination or conspiracy accomplishes a vertical acquisition which re-
moves the acquired concern from the market as a buyer or seller.
Columbia Steel, on the other hand, determined the acquisition's legal-
ity under the second Paramouut rule by its effects on the opportunities of
U.S. Steel's competitors to market their products. The Supreme Court
majority appeared to be testing for the ability to exert "leverage"to gain
control of the level of rolled-steel-product manufacture. The test for
"leverage" necessarily ran in terms of the percentage of the invaded level
acquired. Since Consolidated represented only 3 per cent of the demand
for rolled steel products in the eleven-state area considered the relevant
market, the acquisition was held lawful under the second Paramount rule.
1u Ibid., at 521-23.
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Although the Court did not say what percentage of the rolled-steel-
product market would enable the exertion of "leverage" on the level
above, it obviously thought 3 per cent not enough. The Court found no
evidence of the specific intent now said to be required by the first Para-
mount rule."2
Significantly, two of the three dissenters in the Columbia Steel case
were justice Douglas, the author of Paramount, and justice Murphy, who
wrote Yellow Cab I. justice Douglas placed the case under the first
Paramount rule.
However the acquisition may be rationalized, the effect is plain. It is a purchase for
control, a purchase for control of a market for which United States Steel has in the past
had to compete but which it no longer wants left to the uncertainties that competition
in the West may engender. This in effect it concedes. It states that its purpose in ac-
quiring Consolidated is to insure itself of a market for part of Geneva's production of
rolled steel products when demand falls off.
But competition is never more irrevocably eliminated than by buying the customer
for whose business the industry has been competing."n
justice Douglas here indicated that the assurance of a market in bad
times is not a legitimate business need. The dissent also showed what
justice Douglas thought his Paramount rule meant:
We need not hold that vertical integration is per se unlawful in order to strike down
what is accomplished here. The consequence of the deliberate, calculated purchase for
purpose of control over this substantial share of the market can no more be avoided
here than it was in United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57, and in United States v.
Yellow Cab Co.... The monopoly of this substantial market for rolled steel products
is in itself an unreasonable restraint of trade under § 1 of the Act." 4
The appearance here of Reading II and Yellow Cab I shows the direction
in which the dissenters wanted the law to move, for those cases went on
vertical integration grounds alone." 5
When the Yellow Cab case came up to the Supreme Court for the second
time the only charge under consideration was that of a conspiracy to re-
n Ibid., at 526-27. It should be noted that the Court explicitly recognized technological
requirements as justifying vertical integration. Ibid., at 526. This factor has been mentioned
as one explanation of earlier cases in which vertical integration was the dominant pattern of
the industry. When a court uses technological necessity to justify a particular vertical integra-
tion it may often be difficult to tell whether that is a moving factor in the decision or merely a
makeweight. But where vertical integration is also the dominant pattern of the industry, the
argument of technological necessity takes on credibility and, presumably, is a real factor' in the
decision. The defense of technological necessity in vertical integration cases is very similar
analytically to the only defense the Alcoa opinion allowed in cases of horizontal monopbly-
that the monopoly was "thrust upon" the defendant by the nature of the market.
n3 Ibid., at 537. W Ibid., at 539.
nU The dissent did say that the acquisition might be lawful if it were by an independent
West Coast producer for the purpose of gaining strength to compete with the established
dominant firms.
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strain and monopolize the sale of cabs by control of the principal operat-
mng companies in four cities. The trial court had found no unlawful or
specific intent, and so had held for defendants. The Supreme Court major-
ity merely said that this finding was not clearly erroneous. The possibility
that the restraints were so unreasonable as to be illegal regardless of
specific intent was ignored because the lower court had brushed the notion
aside.
There is some reason to believe that Justice Black's dissent, concurred
in by Justice Reed, would have been the majority opinion but for the fact
that, of the Columbia Steel dissenters, Justices Murphy and Rutledge had
died, and Justice Douglas took no part in the case. The Yellow Cab II dis-
sent thought the evidence that the operating companies were compelled
to purchase from the manufacturing company, and that the operating
companies sometimes paid prices above those paid by cab companies free
to shop around, would support a finding of illegal restraint or monopoly
regardless of intent.116
It is difficult to understand why Justices Black and Reed, both in the
Columbia Steel majority, should dissent here. The presence of local
monopolies in Yellow Cab might seem to differentiate the cases, even
though that was not emphasized in the dissent. The presence of local
monopolies in cab operating, however, is completely irrelevant to the
market for cab sales, which is national. The chief factor present in Yellow
Cab II, and not in Columbia Steel, was the evidence that CCM sometimes
charged the operating companies more than the market price for cabs. But
would a showing that Columbia charged Consolidated higher than market
for rolled steel products have changed the result there? It is to be hoped
that it would not, for that would be a mere bookkeeping matter between
parent and subsidiary."7 Yet, aside from the possibility that the dissenters
16 338 U.S. 338, 344 (1949).
U7 If Consolidated took the charge levied by Columbia as a cost figure, and if that charge
were higher than market, the result would be a restriction of Consolidated's output as com-
pared with the output which would obtain were the market price charged by Columbia. This
is surely not a matter of public concern, however. It means that Columbia and Consolidated
taken together were not maximizing profit. But, since the market is said to be competitive,
Consolidated's restriction of output would have no effect upon industry output or price. The
Yellow Cab situation may be different in that any restriction in the amount of cab service
furnished would not be automatically eliminated by competitors since the furnishing of cab
service is an artificial monopoly. It is, however, a regulated monopoly, and, supposedly, any
restriction of service or increase in fares is policed by the cities concerned. The fact that
municipal regulation may be lax is surely no reason to apply the Sherman Act. Nor does the
fact that Consolidated would be a wholly owned subsidiary, while the cab operating companies
were not, make any difference. Charging higher-than-market prices to a partially owned sub-
sidiary may be a way of cheating minority stockholders, but that again is no concern of the
antitrust laws. See Comment, Vertical Forestalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 583, 593 (1952).
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merely felt the government entitled to a closer examination of the possible
unreasonableness of the restraint regardless of intent, the evidence that
the subsidiary was charged higher-than-market prices seems the only
differentiating factor between Yellow Cab HI and Columbia Steel.
The law concerning vertical integration underwent a further shift upon
the remand of the Paramount case. For one thing, Judge A. N. Hand ap-
peared to state both Paramount rules in terms of horizontal market con-
trol,18 whereas Justice Douglas seemed to have stated only the part of
the second rule dealing with "leverage" in those terms. The first rule, as
originally stated, seemed to refer merely to the control of the acquired
firm. In applying the rules to the Paramount fact situation Judge Hand
said:
We are not satisfied that the plaintiff has shown a calculated scheme to control the
market in the conception of the defendants' vertical integration, rather than a purpose
to obtain an outlet for their pictures and a supply of film for their theatres. But here we
are presented with a conspiracy among the defendants to fix prices, runs and clearances
which we have already pointed out was powerfully aided by the system of vertical
integration of each of the five major defendants. Such a situation has made the vertical
integrations active aids to the conspiracy and has rendered them in this particular case
illegal, however innocent they might be in other situations. We do not suggest that
every vertically integrated company which engages in restraints of trade or con-
spiracies will thereby render its vertical integration illegal. The test is whether there is
a close relationship between the vertical integration and the illegal practices. Here, the
vertical integrations were a definite means of carrying out the restraints and con-
spiracies we have described.1 19
Judge Hand here altered and enlarged the Paramount tests as to the il-
legality of vertical integration, for this passage does not speak in terms of
market power created by vertical integration, but rather in terms of il-
legal acts carried out by means of such integration. It was not suggested
that integration created the power to do those acts, merely that it was
useful in doing them. Thus Judge Hand wrote the Paramount "tools" test
for relief in horizontal monopoly cases into the test for the legality of
vertical integration .20
Judge Hand also found illegality under the second Paramount rule.
M8 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 893 (S.D. N.Y., 1949).
U9 Ibid.
120 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 152-53 (1947). The "tools"
test is really one part of a three-part rule of thumb for divestiture in monopoly or attempted
monopolization cases which may be summarized as follows: (1) Divest anything which hasbeen used as a means or "tool" of monopolization; (2) divest the rewards or "fruits" of monopo-lization; and (3) divest whatever else is necessary to dissipate monopoly power. The second and
third elements of the test were set out in Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334U.S. 110, 128-30 (1947). The "tools" test was added in the Paramount opinion.
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Viewed collectively, defendants had 70 per cent of the first-run theatres
in the ninety-two largest cities. Legally, 70 per cent is an awkward figure
to use in talking about power to exclude competitors. But Judge Hand
thought that 70 per cent control, "when coupled with the strategic ad-
vantages of vertical integration," conferred the power to exclude competi-
tion.1 21 Thus vertical integration was said to add something-undefined-
to horizontal market power; and the presence of vertical integration, at
least where it is closely related to illegal practices, lowers the percentage
of control which constitutes power to exclude.
Judge Hand thus applied two tests: vertical integration was illegal
both because it, together with some horizontal control, created a power
to exclude competitors from horizontal markets, and because it was
closely related to, and was a means of carrying out, illegal practices.2
The cases of the four major groups discussed above comprise all those
usually cited as vertical integration precedent. They were arranged into
four groups primarily so that the early and modern decisions might be
121 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 894 (S.D. N.Y., 1949).
I2 Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp., 201 F. 2d 534 (C.A. 7th, 1953), is
sometimes thought to be another, more recent, vertical integration case. Fargo was a wholesale
dealer in home appliances. Globe manufactured Dutch Oven gas ranges. After an interruption
of production during World War II, Globe prepared to resume making gas ranges by entering
into tentative dealership agreements with a number of retailers and wholesalers, including
Fargo. Before production began, however, stockholders with 40 per cent of Globe's common
opposed re-entry into the gas range field. The difficulty was eventually resolved when Maytag
Co. agreed to buy the stock of the dissenters in return for a source of supply of gas ranges.
Accordingly, an agreement was reached whereby Maytag took all of its ranges from Globe, and
the latter sold to no one else. Maytag bought 40 per cent of Globe's common stock, and Globe
cancelled its agreements with Fargo and the other dealers. Fargo brought suit on the theory
that these facts constituted violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and that the
stock purchase was a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The court treated the case as an
exclusive-dealing arrangement between separate firms rather than as vertical integration. In
order to analyze the case in terms of vertical integration the court would have had to establish
or assume that ownership of 40 per cent of Globe's stock gave Maytag control, but the court
did not touch upon that point. It may be urged, nevertheless, that despite this omission the
court viewed the problem as one of vertical integration. Accepting that argument, it is still not
clear what proposition the case stands for. The district judge held for Fargo, under Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, apparently viewing Globe as a
complete monopolist because no one else made automatic shut-off, heat-retained gas ranges.
101 F. Supp. 460 (N.D. Ill., 1951). The Court of Appeals, however, pointed out that the fea-
tures of the Dutch Oven, while somewhat unique, were not covered by patents. Any manu-
facturer could copy them. Therefore, the Dutch Oven was to be considered a standard gas
range and was competitive with all other such ranges. This definition of the market resulted in
the conclusion that Globe had had but 1.96 per cent of the market in 1949 and 1.82 per cent in
1950. The court held for Globe. This reversal might mean that the case stands for the proposi-
tion that vertical integration is illegal where joined to, or used to extend, horizontal monopoly.
However that may be, it does not negate the idea that such integration is illegal where con-
ceived with specific intent, or where connected with abusive practices. The court mentioned the
lack of intent to monopolize, 201 F. 2d 534, 540 (C.A. 7th, 1953), and there were no abuses
present. Therefore, if the court did deal with the situation as involving vertical integration,
which is doubtful, it added nothing to our knowledge of the law of that subject.
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seen separately. But for purposes of legal classification the early and mod-
em cases belong together. On the other hand, the two subgroups of the
second major group are distinct analytically; their only similarity is that
the cases of both have often been improperly described as vertical integra-
tion precedent. In an analytical summary, therefore, the cases may be
realigned in four general categories.
The first category consists of cases which, though usually said to in-
volve vertical integration, do not belong in that line of precedent because
of their facts. These are the Winslow, Eastman Kodak, and Pullman cases.
(The ownership of stockhouses places Eastman Kodak in the next category
also.) The facts of the cases in the first category show complementary
integration, but if vertical integration is so broadly defined (e.g., Holmes's
case of the manufacture of a complete steam engine), then almost all
manufacture shows such integration, and the term loses its significance.
The second class of cases is composed of those in which vertical integra-
tion is not attacked or discussed. They are Eastman Kodak, Union Carbide,
and International Harvester. The ownership of wholesale businesses, the
only vertical integration in Eastman Kodak, was discussed in terms of an
attempt to monopolize a horizontal market. The International Harvester
opinion did not consider the extensive vertical integration present. The
Union Carbide case was a private action and vertical integration was not
at issue. Thus none of these cases may correctly be used as vertical inte-
gration precedent.
The cases of the third category are those which, insofar as they con-
sider vertical integration at all, approve of it because it is the dominant
pattern of the industry, and because abusive practices are absent. These
cases are United States Steel, Standard Oil (1931 merger), Republic Steel,
and the Alcoa remand. Unlike the cases in the first and second categories,
these are of some force as precedent because vertical integration was
both present and discussed, although the discussions were often cursory
and the integration, in some cases, was not under attack. But whatever
force the cases in this group have is to the effect that vertical integration
is presumptively justified when it is prevalent in the industry and has not
been abused.
The fourth and last category is composed of cases in the main line of
vertical integration precedent. The facts of these cases reveal such inte-
gration, it is under attack, and the courts indicate attitudes toward inte-
gration as such. American Tobacco, Corn Products, Reading I, Reading II,
Lehigh Valley, A & P, Yellow Cab I, Paramount, Columbia Steel, Yellow Cab
II, and the Paramount remand belong in the fourth category. A glance at
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this list makes it apparent that it is incorrect to say that the attack on ver-
tical integration is recent, post-dating 1940, or that courts used to approve
of such integration. And the presence on the list of Reading II, Lehigh Val-
ley, A & P, and Yellow Cab I makes it manifestly incorrect to say that
vertical integration has been condemned only where horizontal monopoly
was present, or where the integration was used to extend monopoly to new
levels. Indeed, the analysis of the cases demonstrates that there is no
single dear-cut doctrine which may be drawn from them. The most accu-
rate generalization is that, when they have looked at it, the courts have
always held vertical integration suspect and have thought that in some
way it enhanced the power of its possessor. But the law has not been
consistent. In the early cases the law was vague and uncertain. Gradually,
through the Anthracite Cases and A & P, it moved toward the per se
position it finally reached in Yellow Cab I. Since then the Supreme Court
has abandoned the per se rule. The law today would seem to be expressed
in Columbia Steel read together with the Paramount remand's inclusion of
the "tools" test. Probably the present law is that vertical integration plus
abuses spells illegality. But the law has not been stable over any ex-
tended period of time. Yellow Cab I and the Anthracite Cases are still avail-
able as precedent. Even if the language of the latter about a "calculated
purchase for control" is read as a requirement of specific intent, such an
intent is easy to find. Any sort of unpleasant behavior may supply specific
intent; any sort of combination, even of noncompeting firms, may take its
place. 1
23
II
The utility of the vertical-integration concept for antitrust law seems a
much easier subject than is the law that has been built around that con-
cept. Yet there is hardly more agreement about the one than the other. It is
the thesis here that the concept is almost entirely lacking in significance
as an analytical tool for differentiating between competition and mo-
nopoly, and that, with one exception, its only proper use is as a term
descriptive of corporate structure.
If it is accepted that the purpose of the antitrust law is the preservation
of a competitive economy, an evaluation of the vertical-integration con-
cept must run largely in terms of its value as a tool of economic analysis.
The economics of the subject have been rather fully discussed by others;"24
so only a summary need be given here.
,23 See United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 7th, 1951), cert.
denied 341 U.S. 916 (1951).
121 Comment, Vertical Forestalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 583,
611-16 (1952), contains much of the analysis adopted here. See also Adelman, Integration and
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Monopoly power is usually defined as the ability to alter the market
price for a product or service.m A firm effects the alteration of market
price through changes in its own output that significantly change the total
output of the industry. Thus monopoly power depends upon the per-
centage of the market occupied by the firm, and the ease of entry into that
market. Vertical integration does not increase the percentage of the
market controlled by a firm. It should be equally apparent that such
integration does not impede entry into a market. Even though almost all
of the myths concerning the ways in which vertical integration confers
market power upon a firm, or facilitates the exploitation of such power,
have been discredited, the theory that vertical integration prolongs
monopoly by imposing greater capital requirements upon potential en-
trants is still confidently advanced in the literature' 2 as though it, too, had
not been badly shaken. Of course, vertical integration could affect entry
only if two levels or stages of operation were monopolized by the inte-
grated firm or cartel, so that entrants would have to come in on both
levels at once. This would indeed require greater capital than would
entrance upon one level. If there are greater-than-competitive profits
being made in the industry, however, there seems no reason why the in-
creased capital necessary for entry would not be forthcoming, unless there
are impediments in the capital market that prevent capital from flowing
to areas where it can most profitably be employed. Until such impedi-
ments have been shown to exist, the fact that increased capital is re-
quired for vertical integration must be assumed to have no adverse effect
upon entry into monopolized markets. Therefore, since vertical integra-
tion does not increase the percentage of a market supplied by a firm and
cannot be shown to impede entry into that market, such integration can
be said to add nothing to monopoly power.
Nor does vertical integration affect a firm's pricing policy. If, for ex-
ample, a firm operates at both the manufacturing and retail levels, it
maximizes over-all profit by setting the output at each level as though
the levels were independent. Where both levels are competitive, the firm
Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27 (1949); Hale, Vertical Integration: Impact of the Anti-
trust Laws upon Combinations of Successive Stages of Production and Distribution, 49 Col. L.
Rev. 921 (1949).
,25 Courts often speak of monopoly as the power to exclude competition, actual or potential.
Such exclusion, however, can be accomplished only through the mechanism of price changes(assuming the absence of "natural" monopolies, patents, etc.); and so the two definitions come
to much the same thing.
m See Comment, Vertical Integration in Aluminum: A Bar to "Effective Competition," 60
Yale L. J. 294, 301-7 (1951); Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 45(1953).
TEE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
maximizes by equating marginal cost and price at each level; each level
makes the competitive return. Where the firm has a monopoly at the
manufacturing level but is competitive in retailing, it will, of course, exact
a monopoly profit at the first level. And the manufacturing level will sell
to the retail level at the same price as it sells to outside retailers.12 7 If the
integrated firm has monopolies at both the manufacturing and retail
levels, however, the levels will not maximize independently. It has already
been explained that vertically integrated monopolies can take but one
monopoly profit. 28 Therefore, if the manufacturing level charged a
monopoly price, the retail level would not act independently and further
restrict output, but would attempt to sell all of the manufacturing level's
output at a competitive margin.
The above analysis supports the thesis that it is always horizontal
market power, and not integration into other levels, which is important.
This thesis has recently been attacked with the argument that, since the
horizontal monopoly power may be impregnable (because it arises from a
patent, natural monopoly in a basic supply, etc.), there may be no
alternative but to dissolve the vertical integration which transmits the
monopoly power from one level to another. 9 The answer to this argu-
17 The integrated firm would have no incentive to price its manufactured product lower to
its own retailers than to outsiders. At best, if the marginal costs of retailing were constant, the
result would be the same total profit as if the owned retailers had been charged the same as
independent retailers. But if, as seems certain in a competitive market, the marginal costs of
retailing were rising, the self-deception involved in selling more cheaply to the affiliated re-
tailers would result in an increased output by those retailers, and the integrated firm would be
paying more for the service of retailing than it would if it operated at a smaller scale on the
retailing level.
,28 See note 65 supra. An interesting sidelight on vertically related monopolies is that it may
be better from the consumers' point of view that such monopolies be integrated rather than in
separate hands. Where the monopolies are integrated consumers will pay the monopoly price.
But where the monopolies are in separate hands the higher monopolist may charge the full
monopoly price to the lower who will in turn accept that price as a cost and further restrict
output and raise price. The price as between the monopolists may be indeterminate, but the
price to consumers will be higher than the single-monopoly price. Of course, the monopolists
may negotiate and lower the price to consumers to the single-monopoly price in order to
maximize the total profit to be split between themselves. Therefore, if both monopolies are
legal, because of patent rights for example, vertical integration or collusion is to be desired
rather than attacked. This analysis has interesting results for theories of countervailing power.
329 Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 45 (1953). The author also
states that "integration that links areas in which competition is already seriously defective to
other areas accomplishes by financial consolidation something very much like what is accom-
plished by the tie-ins prohibited by Section 3 of the Clayton Act." Ibid., at 44. Insofar as this
statement refers to vertical integration it is not completely accurate. A tie-in seems to be
aimed at one of two things: (1) Price discrimination; (2) gaining a monopoly of a product
that is complementary to another product of which a monopoly is already held. The tie-in may
be used to accomplish price discrimination when the tied-in product is employed as a way of
counting, and hence of charging for, the amount of use given the tying product. Thus, those
who have the most use for a salt machine, for example, will pay the most for it through their,
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ment is dear from what has gone before. Suppose a monopolist at one
level does not integrate vertically. He will charge the monopoly price to
his customers, and that toll will be passed on to the ultimate consumers.
What has already been said shows that the gaining of a second monopoly
vertically related to the first would not alter price, output, or the alloca-
tion of productive resources on the second level monopolized. Therefore,
dissolving the vertical integration accomplishes precisely nothing.
130
There is, however, one advantage a monopolist might not otherwise
enjoy which he may obtain by vertical integration: the ability to discrimi-
nate in price between different classes of customers. A monopolist may
have two classes of customers making different products, one of which is
willing to pay more than the other, and yet, because of reselling between
the classes, be unable to take advantage of the situation by discrimina-
tion. If, however, the monopolist should integrate with one of the classes,
leakage would stop and discrimination become possible.'' It is not at all
dear that this result is socially undesirable. One result of the discrimina-
tion is an increased profit for the monopolist. But the objection to
monopoly is not that some people make too much money. It is that
monopoly leads to a misallocation of society's resources through a restric-
purchase of salt tablets. (This explanation of the purpose of some tie-ins was suggested by
Professor Director of the University of Chicago Law School.) In this respect a tie-in may be
similar to some vertical integration, for the latter may occasionally be employed to effect a
price discrimination. See text above. The use of a tie-in to gain a monopoly complementary to
that already possessed is not, however, like vertical integration. The complementary integra-
tion of monopolies and their vertical integration have far different results; they should be kept
analytically distinct. See notes 63-65 supra. [The idea of a tie-in as a device for obtaining com-
plementary monopolies is taken from Bowman and McGee, Product Complementarity and the
Law of Tie-In Sales (unpublished paper).] The writer has no idea which of these uses of the
tie-in device is the more common.
130 This reasoning is applicable to proposals to increase competition in the oil industry by
divesting major oil companies of their pipe lines. See Rostow, A National Policy for the Oil
Industry (1948); Rostow and Sachs, Entry into the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration
Re-Examined, 61 Yale L. J. 856 (1952). The monopoly of the pipe-line companies would in no
way be reduced by their separation from crude producing and refining facilities. Whatever the
effect on nonintegrated crude producers, the price in final markets would be unchanged. Fur-
thermore it is unlikely that such dissolution would affect nonintegrated firms at all. If the
long-term costs of crude production are a function of scale, it would entail a loss for an inte-
grated firm with a pipe-line monopoly to use that monopoly to gain control of crude production.
If these costs are constant, it makes no difference to the pipe-line monopolist, or to the public,
whether or not the monopoly is extended to crude. Neither does it make any sense to say that
the integrated firm practices price discrimination because its charge to itself is not a real charge
whereas the charge to nonintegrated shippers is a real charge. That merely states that the
pipe-line monopoly is charging a monopoly rate. The price discrimination has no effect that the
presence of horizontal monopoly does not. That is, the firm would not think that its crude pro-
duction units had lower shipping costs than competitive units and therefore increase output.
That would result in an improper scale of operation. See the analysis in note 127 supra.
13, Consult Comment, Vertical Forestalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
583, 613 n. 184 (1952).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
tion of output. In many cases, when a monopolist price-discriminates he
tends to increase his output, and the resultant output is more like that
dictated by competition than if he had not discriminated. In some cases
this result may not occur, but on balance it seems more likely.3 2 There-
fore, if the horizontal monopoly is legal, there should be no objection to
price discrimination, and hence none to vertical integration employed to
effect discrimination. The real problem, once more, is horizontal, not
vertical.
This brief statement makes clear the position from which the use of the
vertical-integration concept is criticized. With this analysis in mind we
turn to an examination of some of the more common judicial notions con-
cerning vertical integration. (The italicized statements are abstracted
from the cases.)
Vertical integration may be used to gain a monopoly at one level. This no-
tion appears in the cases but the mechanism by which it operates is rarely
mentioned. There is no such mechanism unless a monopoly at another
level is already held. In that case the important issue is the first monopoly,
not the vertical integration. In any event, the second monopoly adds no
power the first did not confer.
Vertical integration makes possible, or lends itself to, the price "squeeze"
by which a monopolist at one level drives out competitors at another. The
"squeeze" does not automatically result from any internal efficiencies of
integration, for the competitive unit does not maximize profit by reflecting
cost savings in its selling price but by selling at the price established by its
competitors.'3 3 Nor does vertical integration confer any unique ability to
13 See Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis 42-45 (1947).
133 Comment, Vertical Forestalling under the Antitrust Laws, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 583,
614 n. 185 (1952), attempts an explanation of some "squeezes" as follows: "Suppose P is the
sole producer of raw material X and has a subsidiary S which, together with firms T and U, has
monopoly control of the manufacturing of the products into which X is manufactured. In
setting its price to S, T and U, P will equalize marginal revenue with marginal cost and its price
will include a monopoly profit for itself. Similarly, when deciding at what price S is to sell, P
will want to equalize S's marginal revenue with its marginal cost. But the marginal cost of X
as far as P and S are concerned will not be the price set for sales to the entire S-T-U market
since P is charging a monopoly price. Therefore, S's marginal cost will be less than that of T
and U and S's sale price will be less than that at which T and U would normally expect to sell
because of the lower cost figure used by S. Thus P's actions in setting prices as any monopolist
normally would will have the effect of 'squeezing' T and U even though P is not consciously
attempting to drive T and U out of business, but only trying to maximize profits." This reason-
ing appears fallacious. Assume first that P is unable for some reason to break down the monop-
olistic character of the market in which it sells. In this case, regardless of S's cost for X, S is not
maximizing profits unless it sells at the price T and U are charging. S must here be viewed, for
purposes of pricing policy, as an independent firm, and, as such, it will maximize by acting as
a rational oligopolist. Since P cannot break down the oligopoly, it might as well enjoy the
fruits of the oligopoly through the participation of S.
However, P would prefer that the S-T-U market were competitive, for then no restriction in
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"squeeze" as a monopolizing technique. A "squeeze" is nothing more
than a price-cutting campaign at one level. A nonintegrated firm can just
as easily wage this sort of warfare by selling its goods at the cost of the
raw materials as can the second level of a vertically integrated firm. The
use of the term "squeeze" serves only to make the practice seem peculiar
to vertical integration and thus lend an undeserved sinister coloration to
that form of organization.
The vertically integrated firm can monopolize one level by cutting prices there
because it can offset its losses by advancing prices at another level. The
theory of recoupment has been exploded many times. If both levels are
competitive, prices can be advanced at neither; if either level is monopo-
listic, prices would already have been advanced there to make the maxi-
mum profit. In either case, recoupment of losses incurred in price-cutting
is impossible. Leaving out the notion of recoupment, it is possible to say
that predation in one market may be continued longer if money is being
made elsewhere. But this applies to horizontal and diversified, as well as
to vertical, integration.
3 y eliminating profit at one level the vertically integrated firm can undersell
competition at the next. This myth has been as thoroughly discredited as
recoupment. The firm can do this only if it is willing to forgo the return
on part of its invested capital. Any firm, integrated or not, may do the
same thing.
A variation of the above, which appears in the District Court A & P
opinion, is particularly interesting. Profit is eliminated at the retail level, and,
consequently, increased volume is achieved. The increased volume raises the
profits of the manufacturing level. The firm, therefore, not only undersells
its competitors at the retail level, but it sacrifices no profits in doing so. This
argument must assume that the manufacturing level had been operating
at an inefficient scale so that the increase in volume made up for the loss of
retail profits. Of course the firm could have made more money by allowing
its manufacturing units to sell to outsiders, thus obtaining increased
volume at that level without sacrificing any of its retail profits. When
this is seen it becomes apparent that the mechanism described by the
output would occur beyond that imposed by P, and P would reap the entire monopoly profit.
This consideration is relevant in the case where it is possible to break down the monopolistic
character of the market in which P sells. In this situation S would not engage in rational
oligopoly behavior, but would increase its output and drive the selling prices of T and U ever
lower until the processing of raw material X is competitive. This type of "squeeze" should not
be regarded as predatory.
Thus, in the first case no "squeeze" will occur; in the second the "squeeze" is not the un-
planned result of P's maximization but a deliberate policy of reducing the profit margins of
T and U.
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court is merely the sacrifice of profit in order to cut prices. Vertical
integration is not relevant.
Money earned at one level gives a vertically integrated firm an advantage
over its nonintegrated competitors at another level. This is especially true
where the money is paid by the nonintegrated competitors. The advantage is
said to be derived from the fact that the money paid in raises the costs
of the competitors and lowers the costs of the integrated company. Of
course, money received can never lower costs. The competitors' costs are
nqt raised since they would have to pay for essential goods or services at
that level in any event. Since output is determined by marginal cost and
price (or marginal revenue where there is monopoly power), and since
neither is altered by the situation described, the vertically integrated firm
derives no competitive advantage.
One level of a vertically integrated firm may harm another of its own levels
by charging it too high prices. The higher-than-market price to the second
level would cause that level to decrease its output. So long as the market is
competitive (or regulated) no one is damaged by this except the inte-
grated firm which finds itself failing to maximize profits. If the market in
which the second level sells is monopolistic, a restriction of output would
occur anyway. The problem is then the monopoly and not the bookkeep-
ing transactions between the two levels.
The discussion so far has shown that vertical integration is not a useful
tool for economic analysis. Such integration confers no ability to alter
market price, does not impede entry, and adds nothing unique to the
ability to employ predatory tactics. On the contrary, vertical integration
may lead to entirely beneficial results by enabling the firm so organized to
bypass a monopoly at one level, or by enabling the achievement of internal
efficiencies.
But it may still be urged that the concept is a useful one for the anti-
trust law because that law is not, and should not be, exclusively concerned
with economic analysis. It has been argued that the antitrust law has al-
ways been concerned with "unatural" methods of growth. The concept
of vertical integration by acquisition may be one way of talking about
an "unnatural" reaching-out for "power." Vertical acquisition creates
"size," and "size" is said to be a sign of "power." This "size" is ap-
parently not relative size (percentage of market control), for vertical
integration does not affect that. The "size" referred to in this argument
seems to be absolute size. If that is true, then the power it signifies must
be something other than the power to affect price. Perhaps it is the sort
of power that gains political favors. Power in this sense is an extremely
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amorphous concept, but it may nevertheless be something with which
society should be concerned. However that may be, the law of vertical
integration has not developed in that direction. The law's tests as to the
legality of vertical integration are couched, however incorrectly, in eco-
nomic terms, in terms of market power. Nor does the concept of vertical
integration provide an appropriate way of talking about the "power"
created by "size." In the first place, many vertically integrated firms are
of smaller absolute size than many firms not so integrated. In the second
place, vertical integration creates no more absolute size than does any
other form of integration, horizontal, diversified, or complementary. It has
not been suggested that illegality should attach to the multiproduct firm
with 10 per cent of three separate markets, even though it has great abso-
lute size and, presumably, whatever "power" goes with it.
A comparison of the law and the economics of vertical integration
makes it dear that the two bear little resemblance. If the law in this
area is to be concerned with the kind of competition with which econo-
mists are familiar, the concept of vertical integration will have to be
abandoned as an analytical tool. The idea of horizontal integration is suf-
ficient to the tasks of the Sherman Act, and presents, in the guise of
market definition, problems enough for judicial ingenuity.
